Hastings Women’s Law Journal
Volume 8 | Number 2

Article 3

9-1-1997

The Development of Gender-Based Asylum Law:
A Critique of the 1995 INS Guidelines
Diana Saso

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hwlj
Recommended Citation
Diana Saso, The Development of Gender-Based Asylum Law: A Critique of the 1995 INS Guidelines, 8 Hastings Women's L.J. 263 (1997).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hwlj/vol8/iss2/3

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Women’s Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.

The Development of Gender-Based Asylum Law:
A Critique of the 1995 INS Guidelines
Diana Saso*
Olimpial
Olimpia was raped, beaten and continuously abused for months by a
sergeant in the Armed Forces of the Salvadoran military. He raped her at
gunpoint, held grenades to her head, and pummeled her face, causing a
blood clot to form in one eye. The sergeant threatened that if Olimpia ever
told on him he would declare she was a subversive and subject her to having her tongue cut off, her nails removed one by one, her eyes pulled out,
and then she would be killed.
Sofia2
While visiting her uncle who was involved in the controversial agrarian land reform movement, Sofia, along with her uncle, male cousin and
three female cousins, was attacked by armed assailants. They were
dragged to the edge of the farm's waste pit where their hands and feet were
bound and the women were gagged. Forcing the women to watch, the assailants hacked the flesh from the men's bodies with machetes and then
shot the men to death. While a woman who accompanied the attackers
shouted political slogans in the background, the attackers subsequently
raped the women, and then cut them loose, threatening to kill them unless
they fled immediately. Sofia suffered a nervous breakdown and had to remain in the hospital for fifteen days. While visiting her parents, Sofia's
mother introduced her to two of her cousins who recently had fled from the
guerrillas and moved into the neighborhood. Sofia immediately recog-

• Member of the Class of 1997; 1996-97 Managing Editor of the Hastings Women's
Law Journal.
1. The facts described are based on Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir.
1987). The Ninth Circuit granted Olimpia's request for asylum after she had received denials from the Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).
2. The facts described are based on Campos-Guardado v. INS, 809 F.2d 285 (5th Cir.
1987). The Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial of her asylum application by the Immigration
Judge and the BIA.
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nized one of them as one of her attackers. On several occasions, he sought
her out and threatened to kill her and her family if she revealed his identity.
"M ary" 3
Despite being pressured for years by her mother, Mary adamantly refused to undergo female genital mutilation, which is a common traditional
practice in Sierra Leone. At the age of twenty-three, Mary was no longer
given a choice. While asleep in her parents' home, Mary was abducted,
blindfolded, and her hands and legs were bound to prevent her escape.
Against her will, she was taken to a place in the jungle where female genital mutilation is performed as part of an initiation ritual. Using an unsterilized razor, a woman elder performed the mutilation late at night
without giving Mary any anesthesia or medication. Mary's clothes were
removed but she remained bound and was held down while the elder cut
away her clitoris and her labia minora. Other women sang to disguise her
screams. Following her mutilation, Mary was required to take an oath of
secrecy and was threatened with death if she were to reveal information
about the ceremony and her mutilation. 4
"Debra"s
At the age of thirteen, Debra was abducted, gagged, and bound in Sierra Leone. While her female relatives held her down, her clitoris was cut
off with a knife. Women partaking in the ritual beat drums during the
mutilation so no one could hear the screaming. Under the threat of death,
Debra was forced to swear that she would never reveal the details of what
had been done to her. Debra claims that she would rather speak out and
face the threat of death by witchcraft than remain silent and allow her
daughters to be subjected to the same fate. 6

3. The facts described are based on a case decided by an Immigration Judge in Arlington, VA, MatterofM- K-, A72-374-558 (U Arlington, Va. Aug. 9,1995), reported in
IJ Grants Asylum on the Basis of Persecution Relating to Female Genital Mutilation, 72
INTERPRETER RELEASES 1188 (1995). Mary is not the applicant's actual name.
4. Immigration Judge Paul A. Nejelski granted her asylum claim, which was also based
on spousal abuse and her political activism. The INS appealed the decision, but later
withdrew its appeal. See id.
5. The facts described are based on a case decided by an Immigration Judge in Baltimore, MD. The case is reported in More on IJ Decision Granting Asylum Based on
Genital Mutilation, 72 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1265 (1995) and Pamela Constable, INS
Debates Female Mutilation as Basis for Asylum, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 1995, at Dl. Debra is not the applicant's actual name.
6. Immigration Judge John F. Gossart, Jr. denied her asylum application, asserting that
female genital mutilation was an "important ritual" that "binds the tribe" in many Mrican
countries. The applicant's concerns about retribution against her or the forced mutilation
of her daughters did not constitute fear of persecution for asylum purposes. According to
Immigration Judge Gossart, a woman "cannot change the fact that she's a female, but she
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INTRODUCTION
The cases discussed above exemplify the evolving and often erratic nature of the law surrounding gender-based asylum claims. For years, asylum
advocates have exposed the plight of refugee women by highlighting the inconsistencies in the case law and the uncertainty inherent in presenting asylum claims based on gender-related persecution. Asylum advocates, scholars, and international and domestic organizations have emphasized the need
to ameliorate the persecution of refugee women by increasing awareness and
devising more efficient procedures for the adjudication of gender-based
asylum claims. On May 26, 1995, the Immigration and Nationality Service
(INS) published an acknowledgment of this need. 7
In response to the recent and still developing U.S. case law and other
compelling factors, the INS Office of International Mfairs issued a memorandum which was written to "provide the INS Asylum Officer Corps with
guidance and background on adjudicating cases of women having asylum
claims based wholly or in part on their gender.,,8 These guidelines were intended to ameliorate the multiple problems that women refugees face when
presenting claims of gender-based persecution. By educating Asylum Officers as to the procedural considerations unique to gender-based asylum
claims, as well as the legal framework in which these claims should be analyzed, the INS Guidelines represent a significant step toward providing fair
adjudications of claims presented by women fleeing persecution. However,
despite this progress, the Guidelines are inherently deficient, providing only
limited analyses of issues in many areas and wholly failing to discuss others.
mtimately, the case law in the United States must evolve to create a legal
environment in which women can prevail on valid gender-based asylum
claims.
This Comment takes a critical, in-depth look at the INS Guidelines, discussing their strengths, weaknesses, and limitations which affect the adjudication of asylum claims based on gender related persecution. Part I provides
a brief overview of asylum law in the United States. Part IT looks at the
multiple influences which engendered the issuance of the INS Guidelines,
discussing both international and national initiatives. Part m explores the
procedural considerations specific to gender-based asylum claims which
should be employed by Asylum Officers in their adjudications. Part IV
analyzes the legal framework the INS Guidelines provide for the evaluation
of gender-based asylum claims. Part V discusses gender-based asylum case
law since the issuance of the INS Guidelines. Finally, this Comment concan change her mind with regards to her position" toward female genital mutilation, and
choose to "acquiesce to the tribal position." See id.
7. Phyllis Coven, INS Office of International Affairs, Considerations for Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum Claims From Women, May 26, 1995 [hereinafter INS Guidelines or Guidelines].
8. Id. at 1.
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eludes that although the issuance of the INS Guidelines represents a significant step towards creating a more receptive legal environment for women
refugees, ultimately the case law and statutory framework must develop to a
level which compels uniform treatment of gender-based asylum applicants,
and the INS must adhere to the guidelines it promulgated.

I.

OVERVIEW OF U.S. ASYLUM LAW9

In the pre-World War II era, the immigration laws of the United States
did not recognize a right to asylum.lO Following World War II, up until
1980, the United States responded to refugee problems by enacting legislation to address refugee crises as they arose. 11 In 1968, the United States acceded to the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. 12 Despite this accession, the U.S. did not incorporate the provisions of
the 1967 Protocol into U.S. immigration law until the Refugee Act of
1980.13 With this enactment, Congress intended to bring U.S. law into
compliance with the 1967 Protocol, and to improve the existing asylum procedures. 14 Regulations setting forth a formal asylum application process
were not codified until 1990. 15 These regulations were recently reformed
and the new regulations were published in December 1994. 16
Under the current asylum application process, an immigrant can apply

9. This comment provides only a brief overview of asylum law in the United States.
For a detailed analysis of U.S. asylum law, see generally DEBORAH E. ANKER, THE LAw OF
AsYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES: A GUIDE TO ADMINISTRATIVE PRAcrICE AND CASE LAW (2d
ed. 1991). For a discussion of recent changes to U.S. asylum law, see AUSTIN T.
FRAGOMEN, JR., ET AL., 1996 IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION HANDBOOK 5-1-5-20 (1996).
10. RICHARD A. BOSWELL, IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAw 147 (2d ed. 1992).
11. See id. at 147-48.
12. United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature
Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol]. The 1967
Protocol incorporated Articles 2 through 34 of the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189
U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter 1951 Convention]. See also Nancy Kelly, Gender-Related Persecution: Assessing the Asylum Claims of Women, 26 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 625, 634 n.40
(1993). By acceding to the 1967 Protocol, signatory nations are bound by the Articles of
the 1951 Convention.
13. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.c. § 1101
(1988». The Refugee Act of 1980 directed the Attorney General, through the Immigration
and Naturalization Service, to "establish a procedure for an alien physically present in the
United States or at a land border or port of entry .. , to apply for asylum ...." Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA) § 208(a), 8 U.S.c. § 1158 (1994).
14. Prior to the Refugee Act of 1980, the United States did not have a uniform procedure for granting asylum in the U.S. See Jeanne A. Butterfield, The New Asylum Regulations: A Practitioner's Guide, IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS, Jan. 1995, at 1.
15. The asylum application process was first manifested in the form of interim regulations; the INS codified the asylum application process in final asylum regulations which
were published in 1990. The final regulations are codified at 8 C.F.R. § 208 (1996). See
Butterfield, supra note 14, at 1 n.4.
16. [d. at 2.
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for asylum in one of two ways: affrrmatively or defensively.17 Afftrmative
claims are made when aliens ftle directly with the INS .18 Approximately
ninety percent of asylum claims are made affrrmatively.19 Immigrants may
also raise a claim of asylum defensively as a form of relief in exclusion or
deportation proceedings before an Immigration Judge. 20 Under the Refugee
Act, which is codifted within the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),21
asylum is available to aliens who are in the United States, or at a U.S. land
border or port of entry when they request refuge. The Attorney General has
the discretion to grant asylum to any person who meets the statutory defmition of "refugee.,,22
.
The INA's defmition adopted the language of the 1951 United Nations
Convention which defmes a refugee as:
any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality
or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any
country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail
himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion. 23
Thus, to prevail on an asylum claim, the applicant must establish that
she has been persecuted in the past or has a well-founded fear of persecution
in the future,24 that the feared persecution will be by the government or by
someone the government is unwilling or unable to control,25 that the perse17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1524 (1994).
The INA was recently amended by the megal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) [hereinafter IIRAIRA]. See
FRAGOMEN, JR., ET AL., supra note 9, at 5-1-5-20.
22. The definition is set forth at INA § 101 (a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(42)(A) (1994).
23. Id. According to at least one commentator, "[t]he only substantive difference between the refugee definition contained in the Convention and that adopted by the United
States through the Refugee Act was the inclusion in the Refugee Act of past persecution as
a basis for determination of refugee status." Kelly, supra note 12, at 634 n.42.
24. In Matter of Chen, Int. Dec. 3104 (BIA 1989), the BIA held that an applicant can
establish eligibility for asylum based on past persecution even when he or she does not
have a well-founded fear of future persecution. The regulations provide that an applicant's
proof of past persecution creates a rebuttable presumption of a well-founded fear of future
persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 108. 13(b)(1) (1996). For a recent analysis of the past persecution standard, see In re H-, Int. Dec. 3276 (BIA 1996). See also Deborah Anker et aI.,
The BIA's New Asylum Jurisprudence and Its Relevance for Women's Claims, 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1173, 1177-78 (1996) (discussing analysis of past persecution standard in In re H- and its relevance to gender-based asylum claims).
25. See, e.g., Matter of McMullen, 658 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1981) (claiming Irish gov-
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cution is on account of one of the five enumerated grounds,26 and that her
asylum application should be granted in the exercise of discretion. 27

II. BACKGROUND TO THE GUIDELINES AND
INTERNATIONAL GUIDANCE
As the asylum application process continued to evolve, developments in
both the international and North American spheres contributed to the formulation and issuance of the INS Guidelines. Common to both spheres was the
growing recognition that women's rights are human rights and its corollary,
violations of women's rights are violations of human rights. 28 Existing international human rights instruments and the interpretation of these instruments by international organizations provide an appropriate and instructive
framework in which gender-based claims can be evaluated. 29
A. INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
For the past two decades, the United Nations has promoted the principle
that women's rights are human rights and that women's rights are universal.
In 1979, the United Nations' General Assembly adopted the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
ernment was unable to prevent persecution of the applicant by the Provisional Irish Republican Army). Gender-based asylum applicants often face persecution at the hands of
non-governmental persons. See, e.g., Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1991)
(applicant was repeatedly beaten and raped by guerrillas in El Salvador); CamposGuardado v. INS, 809 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1987) (applicant was raped and forced to watch
the murder of her relatives by armed assailants in EI Salvador); Matter of A- and Z-,
A72-190-893, A72-793-219 (U Arlington, Va. Dec. 20, 1994), reported in /J Grants Asylum to Woman Based on Spousal Abuse, INS Guidelines Imminent, 72 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 521 (1995) (applicant exposed to ongoing physical and verbal abuse by her husband); Matter ofM- K-, A72-374-558 (U Arlington, Va. Aug. 9, 1995), reported in /J
Grants Asylum on the Basis of Persecution Relating to Female Genital Mutilation, supra
note 3, at 1188 (applicant subjected to female genital mutilation by tribal women elders).
26. In cases based on political opinion, the persecution may be based on an opinion imputed to the applicant by the persecutor in addition to persecution on account of her own
political opinion. See, e.g., Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding
applicant was eligible for political asylum based on her own political opinion and on the
political opinion imputed to her by her persecutor). The Supreme Court's decision in INS
v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992), placed the viability of the imputed political opinion basis in question. But see Kelly, supra note 12, at 636 n.47 (citing GROVER J. REES ill,
GENERAL COUNSEL, IMMIGRATION AND NATURAliZATION SERVICE, LEGAL OPINION:
CONTINUED VIABILITY OF THE DOCTRINE OF IMpUTED POLITICAL OPINION (JAN. 19, 1993»
(stating that "persecution inflicted because the persecutor erroneously imputes to the victim one of the protected characteristics set forth in Section 101(a)(42) can constitute persecution 'on account of that characteristic for the purpose of asylum or refugee analysis").
27. See Butterfield, supra note 14, at 3; Kelly, supra note 12, at 635-36.
28. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 1-2 ("Spurred by the United Nations and a handful
of commentators, notably in Canada and the United States, understanding of genderrelated violence in general is increasing.").
29. "These instruments need not be ratified by the United States to provide guidance as
a source of human rights norms." INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 2 n.2 (citing INS BASIC
LAwMANUAL 11-12 (2d. ed ».
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(CEDAW).30 CEDAW, the most comprehensive international human rights
instrument for women, seeks to eliminate the obstacles which prevent the
equal participation of women in political, social, economic, and cultural
life. 31 Signatory States are prohibited from engaging in discriminatory acts
and are required to take affrrmative steps to eradicate discriminatory treatment towards women. 32
The comprehensive nature of CEDAW set the stage for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Executive Committee's
adoption of Conclusion No. 3933 in 1985, the ftrst UNHCR statement of its
kind. 34 This "Conclusion on Refugee Women" noted that refugee women
and girls constitute the majority of the world refugee population with many
being exposed to special problems due to their gender. The 1985 Conclusion encouraged countries to recognize women asylum-seekers who face
harsh and inhuman treatment due to their transgression of social mores as a
"particular social group" within the meaning of Article lA(2) of the 1951
Convention. 35 Because the UNHCR' s interpretations of the 1951 Convention are widely respected and often followed, the 1985 Conclusion initiated
greater recognition of gender-related persecution claims. 36
The 1985 Conclusion was followed by the UNHCR's issuance of its
"Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women,,37 in 1991. Although the
UNHCR Guidelines primarily focus on issues pertaining to women in refugee camps, they also highlight the need to address gender-based persecution. 38 The UNHCR Guidelines mark a turning point in the international
awareness of the plight of women fleeing persecution on account of their
gender. 39 In particular, they represent international recognition that immigration laws need to accept gender-based persecution as a valid basis for acquiring asylum or refugee status. 40 Thus, the UNHCR Guidelines encourage states to adopt procedures which make the refugee adjudication process
30. COMPENDIUM OF INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS CONCERNING THE STATUS OF WOMEN
at 17, U.N. Doc. ST/CSDHAl3, U.N. Sales No. E.88.IV.3 (1988).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 18. See also INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 2.
33. Refugee Women and International Protection Report, U.N. HCR Executive Comm.,
36th Sess., 'I 115(4)(k), U.N. Doc. AlAG.96/673 (1985) [hereinafter 1985 Conclusion].
34. Pamela Goldberg, Asylum Law and Gender-Based Persecution Claims, IMMIGR.
BRIEFINGS, Sept. 1994, at 3.
35. The 1985 Conclusion was preceded by a resolution adopted by the European Parliament which called upon member states to accord refugee status within the particular
social group category of the refugee definition to women who suffer cruel and inhuman
treatment because they have violated the moral or ethical rules of their society. See Kelly,
supra note 12, at 659 nn.163, 165; Goldberg, supra note 34, at 3 n.22.
36. Goldberg, supra note 34, at 3.
37. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, GUIDEUNES ON THE PRoTECflON OF REFUGEE WOMEN (1991) [hereinafter UNHCR GUIDELINES].
38. Goldberg, supra note 34, at 3. See also INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 3.
39. Goldberg, supra note 34, at 3.
40. Id.
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more accessible to women.41
In response to the UNHCR Guidelines, the United Nations Conference
on Human Rights emphasized the need to incorporate the rights of women as
part of universal human rights,42 and called upon the General Assembly to
adopt the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women in
June 1993. 43 The 1993 Declaration, adopted by the General Assembly on
December 20, 1993, recognized violence against women as both a per se
violation of human rights and as an impediment to the enjoyment by women
of other human rights. 44 Additionally, in October 1993, the UNHCR Executive Committee adopted Conclusion No. 73 on Refugee Protection and
Sexual Violence (1993 Conclusion), which recognized that refugee women
who are victims of sexual violence should be treated with particular sensitivity.45 Thus, under the 1993 Conclusion, nations should establish training
programs designed to sensitize those involved in the refugee status determination process to issues of gender and culture.

B. NORTHAMERICANDEVELOPMENTS
While United Nations initiatives between 1979 and 1993 brought attention to gender-based persecution in the international sphere, two recent developments in Canada and the United States increased awareness in the
North American sphere about the plight of refugee women, presenting effective frameworks in which gender-based asylum claims can be determined. In
March 1993, the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) issued a
comprehensive set of guidelines for adjudicating the asylum claims of refugee women fleeing persecution. 46 The Canadian Guidelines were the fust
national guidelines to formally recognize that women fleeing gender-related
persecution can be refugees under the 1951 Convention. 47 Even more ex-

41. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 3.
42. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 2 (citing Adoption of the Final Documents and Report of the Conference: Report of the Drafting Committee, Addendum, Final Outcome of
the World Conference of Human Rights, U.N. HCR, at 8-9, , 9, U.N. Doc.
A\Conf.157\DC\l\Add.l (1993)).
43. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 2 (citing Adoption of the Final Documents and Report of the Conference: Report of the Drafting Committee, Addendum, Final Outcome of
the World Conference of Human Rights, U.N. HCR, at 23, , 3, U.N. Doc.
A\Conf.l57\DC\l\Add.l (1993)).
44. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 48/104, U.N.
GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 217, U.N. Doc. Al48/49 (1993). Vienna Declaration
and Programme of Action, Note by the Secretariat, U.N. GAOR, at 18-20, U.N. Doc.
AlCONF.157/23 (1993).
45. Executive Committee Conclusion No. 73, Refugee Protection and Sexual Violence,
U.N. HCR Executive Comm., 44th Sess., U.N. Doc. AlAC.96/821 (1993).
46. IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BOARD, GUIDEUNES IsSUED BY THE CHAIRPERSON
PuRSUANT TO SECTION 65(3) OF THE IMMIGRATION ACT: WOMEN REFUGEE CLAIMANTS
FEARING GENDER-RELATED PERSECUTION (1993) [hereinafter CANADIAN GUIDELINES].
47. See INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 3.
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. pansive than the UNHCR Guidelines,48 the Canadian Guidelines remain a
model for gender-based asylum adjudications more than 3 years after their
release. 49
In April 1994, asylum advocates 50 in the United States presented proposed Guidelines for Women's Asylum Claims 51 to the INS. The Proposed
Guidelines responded to the increasing number of women filing genderbased asylum applications, and the expressed concerns of observers that the
asylum adjudication system was not as open to women as it should be. 52 By
highlighting these concerns to the INS, these advocates were instrumental in
the development of the INS Guidelines. 53
In April 1994, the INS convened a meeting to discuss the Proposed
Guidelines and issues relating to women asylum seekers. 54 One year and
one month later, the INS Guidelines were issued as a "natural and multifaceted outgrowth" of these multiple influences and the recent and still developing case law in the United States. Although the INS Guidelines reflect
many of the recommendations in the Proposed Guidelines, they are not
nearly as permissive in their approach to adjudicating gender-based asylum
claims nor as liberal in their analysis of the case law. 55
The INS Guidelines are intended to improve the asylum adjudication
process in several ways. First, by addressing issues specific to genderrelated asylum claims, the INS Guidelines permit the United States to keep
pace with gender-related human rights concerns. Second, the INS Guidelines provide a useful tool which Asylum Officers can employ to ensure uniformity and consistency in procedures and decisions relating to gender-based
asylum adjudications. Finally, the Guidelines seek to improve the ability of
Asylum Officers to deal more sensitively with procedural and substantive
aspects of gender-related claims, irrespective of the applicant's country of
origin.

48. In contrast to the UNHCR Guidelines which primarily focus on issues pertaining to
women in refugee camps, the Canadian Guidelines provide "a systematic method for the
evaluation of gender-based persecution claims based on any of the applicable five grounds:
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, and political opinion."
Goldberg, supra note 34, at 4.
49. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 3.
50. Nancy Kelly, Women Refugees Project of Cambridge and Somerville Legal Services
and Clinical Instructor at the Harvard Immigration and Refugee Program, drafted the
guidelines with the assistance of Deborah Anker, Women Refugees Project and Lecturer
on Law and Coordinator at the Harvard Immigration and Refugee Program, and Michele
Beasley, Member of the Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children and Associate at Chadbourne & Parke.
51. Nancy Kelly, et aI., Guidelines for Women's Asylum Claims, 71 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 813 (1994) [hereinafter Proposed Guidelines].
52. Id. at 813.
53. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 4.
54. Goldberg, supra note 34, at 4 n.36; INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 4.
55. See infra notes 148-55 and accompanying text.

272

HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 8:2

III. PROCEDURAL CONSIDERATIONS IN GENDER-BASED
ASYLUM CLAIMS
After discussing the background to the INS Guidelines, the memorandum proceeds to delineate "Procedural Considerations for U.S. Asylum Officers." The purpose of this section is to educate the Asylum Officer Corps
(AOC) about issues which are particularly relevant to gender-based asylum
applications. This section of the INS Guidelines touches on many important
factors of which the AOC should be aware. However, the Guidelines are
notably sparse in their discussion of some factors and entirely fail to mention
others.
The INS Guidelines acknowledge two types of persecution women may
face: 1) gender-specific persecution;56 and 2) gender-related persecution. 57
Mistreatment that is primarily directed at the female population constitutes
gender-specific persecution. The INS Guidelines specify rape, sexual abuse,
domestic violence, infanticide, and genital mutilation as forms of persecution
which are particular to women. 58
In contrast, gender-related persecution is often associated with women
from countries that maintain laws and customs which discriminate on the
basis of gender. When women breach these laws, they may be subjected to
harsh punishments and abuse that are not meted out to the general popUlation. The persons who "enforce" these laws can be government authorities,
or private individuals who the government is unwilling or unable to control. 59 Due to these discriminatory laws and norms, women are severely hindered from exercising their social, political, civil, and economic rights.
The INS Guidelines attempt to alert the AOC to scenarios of genderrelated persecution that women may face. For example, the Guidelines note
that women may face harm as a result of "marrying outside of an arranged
marriage, wearing lipstick, or failing to comply with other cultural or religious norms.,,60 However, although this list is illustrative rather than exhaustive, the INS failed to provide additional examples to adequately educate the

56. Gender-specific persecution includes acts that are specific to women such as rape,
infanticide, genital mutilation, bride burning, forced sterilization, and domestic violence.
Goldberg, supra note 34, at 5.
57. Gender-related persecution encompasses situations where harm is imposed or
threatened because of gender. This category includes cultural, social and religious norms
which restrict the activities and choices of women (such as requiring women to dress in a
particular way) and situations which subject women to extreme discrimination (such as
being denied access to higher education). See id.
58. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 4. The INS Guidelines also recognize that women
who have been sexually abused or raped may face stigmatism and ostracism from their societies and families. Because they may be viewed as shaming or dishonoring themselves,
their families and communities, these women may be vulnerable to discrimination, abuse
or further violence. Id. at 5.
59. See supra note 25.
60. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 4.
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Asylum Officers. Specifically, the INS could have at least mentioned refusal to wear the "chador" or veil which can subject women to considerable
abuse in Iran as noted in four gender-based asylum cases. 61
Despite this oversight, the INS Guidelines do acknowledge that women
may present asylum claims based on gender-specific or gender-related persecution that can be analyzed and approved under one or more of the five
enumerated grounds for asylum. 62 For example, an applicant who was
raped may have suffered persecution on account of her political opinion and
her membership in a particular social groUp.63 However, although the INS
Guidelines explain that gender-specific or gender-related persecution may
fall under more than one of the five categories, they do not specify which of
these categories or why. This failure to provide enough guidance is prevalent throughout the INS Guidelines, illustrating its deficiencies and emphasizing the limited effect it can have on the adjudication of women's asylum
claims.
In addition to identifying types of persecution women particularly may
face, the IN.S Guidelines also provide the AOe with guidance on how to effectively and sensitively interview women fleeing persecution. The Guidelines acknowledge that women may be reluctant to reveal "the very delicate
and personal issues arising from sexual abuse.,,64 The INS states that by
reading the asylum application before the interview, the Asylum Officer may
learn that the applicant is a victim of sexual abuse. 65 In such a situation, the
INS Guidelines intimate66 that in response to this "warning," Asylum Of61. See Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233 (3d Cir. 1993); Safaie v. INS, 25 F.3d 636 (8th Cir.
1994); Fisher v. INS, 61 F.3d 1366 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd en bane 79 F.3d 955 (9th Cir.
1996); Hartooni v. INS, 21 F.3d 336 (9th Cir. 1994). See also CANADIANGUIDEUNEs, supra note 46, at 4 (discussing oppression of women in the context of religious laws); Proposed Guidelines, supra note 51, at 818 (stating that women who may suffer persecution
for choosing not to follow precepts of state religion may establish an asylum claim based
on religious persecution).
62. See INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 4. The five enumerated grounds are race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, and political opinion.
63. The applicant's persecutor may rape her because of her own political opinion or because of her membership in a particular social group of women who hold that same political opinion.
64. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 5.
65. Id.
66. The organization of the discussion of this issue in the INS Guidelines makes it unclear whether this is a valid conclusion. The INS first explains that Asylum Offices may
allow female Officers to interview gender-based asylum claims, but only if available. In
the next paragraph the INS states that a screening of the asylum application can often
identify cases involving sexual abuse. The Guidelines then go on to say that if the abuse is
not revealed until the interview, male and female Officers should take the "utmost care to
assure that the interview continues in an atmosphere that allows for the discussion of past
experiences." Thus, the INS appears to be instructing that if a screening of the asylum
application indicates that the applicant is a victim of sexual abuse, and a female Officer is
available, then she should conduct the interview of the applicant. See INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 5.
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fices should have women Officers interview gender-based asylum applicants,
but only to the extent that personnel resources will permit. However, the
interview should not be canceled because a female Officer is not available;
all Asylum Officers will be expected to conduct interviews of women refugees. 67 If the fact that the applicant has suffered sexual abuse is not revealed until the interview, Asylum Officers must exercise their "utmost
care" to maintain an environment which is conducive to a full disclosure of
the applicant's past experiences.68
The INS Guidelines also instruct Asylum Officers to be conscious of the
effect that the presence of family members and the use of male interpreters
may have on the interview process. 69 In some countries, family members
may alienate the victims of sexual violence, viewing such violence as the
woman's fault for failing to preserve her virginity or marital dignity. 70
Thus, women applicants should be afforded the opportunity to relate their
story outside the presence of family, especially male family members and
children.71 The applicant's testimony may be less traumatic if she can communicate freely without fearing the reaction of family members who may not
be aware of the abuse she has suffered. 72 For these reasons, the INS Guidelines suggest that family members or friends should not be employed as interpreters because they may hinder the full disclosure of persecution the
applicant has experienced.73
The INS Guidelines also note that the applicant's testimony may be diluted or desensitized through the filter of a male interpreter especially regarding such issues as sexual abuse. 74 However, if a gender-based asylum
applicant arrives with a male interpreter, the interviews "should not generally be canceled and rescheduled.,,75 The UNHCR and Proposed Guidelines
recommend that women interpreters be employed to determine refugee
status. 76 However, the applicant is required to provide her own interpreter if
needed. 77 This requirement can place a considerable burden on an applicant
who may have fled her native country with no contacts in the United States
and no knowledge of United States immigration law. 78
67. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 5.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 5-6.
71. Id. at 5. Interviewing women applicants outside the presence of their families creates an atmosphere which allows for a more open discussion of past experiences. See id.
72. See id. at 5-6.
73. See id. at 5.
74. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 5.
75. Id.
76. Proposed Guidelines, supra note 51, at 823.
77. This is one of the requirements which was added by the Dec. 1994 asylum regulations which was not found in the previous regulations. Butterfield, supra note 14, at 8.
78. The INS Guidelines state that they are "hopeful that NGOs [Non-Governmental Organizations] will convey our openness to female interpreters," possibly implying that
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According to the INS Guidelines, all asylum interviews should be nonadversarial, creating an atmosphere conducive to a comprehensive discussion of past experiences.?9 Thus, Asylum Officers should attempt to develop
a rapport with the applicant creating an environment in which the applicant
feels comfortable recounting occurrences in the past and enabling the Asylum Officer to elicit possible claims. 80 Acquiring the trust of the applicant,
however, may prove difficult for the Asylum Officer because s/he is a government official in a position of authority. 81 The applicant may be fleeing
persecution inflicted by government officials or from a country in which she
has reason to distrust authority figures. 82 Thus, the Guidelines warn that
Asylum Officers should be aware that the applicant's initial timidity is not
necessarily indicative of a lack of credibility, but may be a result of her past
experiences. 83
Despite the efforts of the INS to provide guidance to the AOe on interviewing women fleeing gender-based persecution, the Guidelines fail to
mention an additional consideration which directly addresses credibility
fmdings in gender-based asylum claims. Because many asylum claims are
often denied due to an alleged lack of credibility, this oversight is significant. 84 Also absent from the Guidelines is the acknowledgment that in many
countries, men do not inform their spouses or female relatives of their political, military, or social affairs. 85 Women, therefore, often do not possess
specific information about the activities of male relatives. 86 Thus, Asylum
Officers should not attribute deficiencies in the applicant's knowledge to a
lack of credibility unless the Officer can cite other evidence which substantiates a negative credibility finding. 8?
The INS Guidelines do acknowledge that women applicants will often
NGOs may be a source of female interpreters and that interpreters can be sure that the INS
is now sensitized to the problems gender-persecuted applicants may face during the interview. See INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 5.
79. Id. at 6.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. The INS Guidelines cite to the UNHCR Handbook at '1198 which states: "A person
who, because of his [or her] experiences, was in fear of the authorities in his [or her] own
country may still feel apprehensive vis-a.-vis any authority. He [or she] may therefore be
afraid to speak freely and give a full and accurate account of his [or her] case." INS
Guidelines, supra note 7, at 6 n.lO.
84. See, e.g., In re Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278 (BIA 1996) (overturning Immigration
Judge's denial of asylum where denial was based in part on lack of credibility); see also
Karen Musalo, In Re Kasinga: A Big Step Forwardfor Gender-Based Asylum Claims, 73
INTERPRETER RELEASES 853, 855, 857-58 (1996) (discussing credibility findings of U and
BIA).
85. Proposed Guidelines, supra note 51, at 823. CANADIAN GUIDELINES, supra note 46,
at 9.
86. Proposed Guidelines, supra note 51, at 823.
87. Id. at 824 (citing UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 37, at 40-43, T)[71-75).
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have difficulty discussing past persecution or experiences which were
"personally degrading, humiliating, or culturally unacceptable. ,,88 The
Guidelines instruct the Asylum Officers not to initiate the interview with
questions about sensitive matters such as sexual abuse and violence. 89
Rather, they should proceed to these issues as the interview progresses. 90
The focus of the interview should be on establishing whether the requisite
persecution has occurred and the apparent motive of the perpetrator, not the
precise details of the abuse. 91
Furthermore, the INS Guidelines recognize that "[w]omen who have
been subject to domestic or sexual abuse may be psychologically traumatized.,,92 This trauma93 may have a significant impact on the applicant's
testimony94 and should be taken into consideration when evaluating her
credibility and demeanor. 95 The INS Guidelines notably emphasize that
when evaluating credibility, Asylum Officers must recognize the effect of
trauma and culture on an applicant's demeanor and that demeanor is not the
sole criterion on which credibility should be judged. 96 illtimately, poor interview techniques and cross-cultural SkillS,97 and an ignorance of issues

88. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 6.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. The Proposed Guidelines, following the UNHCR Guidelines, instruct, "[d]o not
ask for details of sexual abuse; the important thing in establishing a well-founded fear of
persecution is to establish that some form of it has occurred." Proposed Guidelines, supra
note 51, at 823 (citing UNHCR GUIDELINES, supra note 37, at 41," 72).
92. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 7.
93. The Proposed Guidelines explain that women applicants who are victims of violence, particularly sexual violence, may exhibit a "pattern of symptoms known as PostTraumatic Stress Disorder or Rape Trauma Syndrome, that makes it extremely difficult for
them to testify." Proposed Guidelines, supra note 51, at 823. The UNHCR Guidelines
instruct that symptoms of Rape Trauma Syndrome include a loss of self-confidence, persistent fear, difficulty in concentration, a pervasive feeling of loss of control, an attitude of
self-blame and memory loss or distortion. Proposed Guidelines, supra note 51, at 823-24
(citing UNHCR GUIDELINES, supra note 37, at 40-43, Tl71-75).
94. The Guidelines describe varying effects of trauma on an applicant's demeanor exemplified by emotional passivity and numbness when reciting past persecution, and loss,
distortion or a complete mental block of memory. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 7.
95. The INS Guidelines note that cross-cultural sensitivity is required of all Asylum Officers irrespective of gender and that it is essential to the assessment of credibility and demeanor. Demeanor is defined as "how a person handles himselflherself physically," i.e.
eye contact, body language, and hesitation in speech. Thus, the Officer should be aware
that although people who avert their gaze from their interviewer in Western cultures are
perceived as not credible, in certain Asian cultures, it is a sign of respect to avert their eyes
when speaking to an authority figure. Id. at 6-7.
96. The INS Guidelines explain the issues of demeanor and credibility further in a footnote. The INS emphasizes that although demeanor is relevant to the evaluation of credibility, it should not be used as the exclusive method for this assessment. Rather, demeanor
should be viewed in conjunction with the overall evaluation of the testimony and evidence
submitted. See id. at 7 n.1.
97. See id. at 7.
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specifically related to gender-based asylum claims, may produce faulty
negative credibility fmdings which can ultimately result in sending women
straight back into the hands of their persecutors. Thus, the AOC must make
every effort to implement these procedural considerations into their adjudication process. Although the INS adopted a fairly liberal approach to interviewing techniques as evidenced above, unfortunately, it does not maintain the same progressive approach in its analysis of the case law.

IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF GENDER-BASED ASYLUM
CLAIMS 98
Building on the "Procedural Considerations" section of the INS
Guidelines, the "Legal Analysis of Claims,,99 section is designed to instruct
Asylum Officers on how gender-based asylum claims should be analyzed
within the framework of United States case law. Due to the complexity of
these types of asylum claims and the developing nature of the case law,
this section appropriately constitutes the bulk of the INS Guidelines. However, despite its appearance of extensive coverage, there are some areas
which the INS Guidelines do not address at all and others in which the
analysis could be much more instructive regarding the extant case law. loo
In its overview of gender-based asylum case law in the United States,
the Legal Analysis section states that asylum claims of women will often
have nothing to do with their gender. However, the INS Guidelines also
point out that an adjudicator should be aware of other cases in which the
"applicant's gender may bear on the claim in significant ways ....,,101
These "other cases" often involve asylum claims which are either genderspecific or gender-related. 102 Although the INS Guidelines do not explicitly categorize gender-based claims into these two categories, they note
that gender-related claims can raise unique and complex issues.103 Furthermore, because gender-based asylum is a developing area, the INS
98. Part ill of the INS Guidelines, "Legal Analysis of Claims," is divided into three
main sections: 1) "Persecution: How Serious Is the Harm?;" 2) "Nexus: The 'On Account
of Requirement;" and 3) "Public versus Private Acts." INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 8,
10, 16. The analysis of this comment will adhere to this framework, but will expand the
subsections to include issues not mentioned in the INS Guidelines.
99. See id. at 8-18.
100. The author acknowledges that the INS Guidelines are intended to serve only as a
"guidance" or "considerations" to Asylum Officers. However, as will be discussed in Part
B of this section, certain areas could have been developed in much greater detail to provide
a more accurate instruction as to the state of the law regarding gender-based claims.
101. Id. at 8.
102. See supra note 56 (providing examples of gender-specific persecution); supra note 57
(discussing forms of gender-related persecution).
103. "For example, the applicant may assert a particular kind of harm, like rape, that either is unique to women or befalls women more commonly than men. Or an applicant may
assert that she has suffered persecution on account of her gender or because of her membership in a social group constituted by women. She might also assert that her alleged
persecutors seek to harm her on account of a political or religious belief concerning gen-
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Guidelines encourage adjudicators to "freely seek legal counsel regarding
these issues as the decisional law evolves."l04 Nevertheless, the INS instructs that, ultimately, all applications must be "analyzed within the terms
of United States law.,,105

A. PERSECUTION
To prevail on a request for asylum, the applicant must satisfy the frrst
component under the refugee defmition which requires her to establish past
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution. She can do this by demonstrating that the harm she fears or has suffered in the past, rises to the
level of persecution as that term is defmed under the relevant domestic and
intemationallaw. I06 Due to the absence of a defmition of persecution in the
Immigration and Nationality Act, it has been left up to the Board of Immigration Appeals and the courts to defme the term. In Matter of Acosta, 107
the BIA interpreted persecution to include threats to life, confmement, torture, and economic restrictions so severe that they constitute a threat to life
or freedom.108 However, "[g]enerally harsh conditions shared by many other
persons" do not rise to the level of persecution. 109 The Ninth Circuit has interpreted persecution to involve "the infliction of suffering or harm upon
those who differ ... in a manner regarded as offensive," 11 0 and where "there
is a difference between the persecutor's· views or status and that of the victim; it is oppression which is inflicted because of a difference the persecutor
will not tolerate.,,111 Consistent with this interpretation, the INS Guidelines
state that although "discriminatory practices and experiences are not generally regarded by themselves as persecution, they 'can accumulate. over
der." INS Guidelines. supra note 7, at 8.
104. Id.
105. Id. This statement by the INS further substantiates the conclusion that U.S. case
law must evolve to a stage where precedents have been set which recognize gender-based
asylum claims in the multiple contexts in which they arise.
106. Adjudicators may utilize human rights instruments as a source of human rights
norms even though the instruments have not been ratified by the United States. Proposed
Guidelines, supra note 51, at 816 n.21 (citing INS BASIC LAw MANUAL, supra note 29, at
11-12, 20). Unfortunately, although the INS claims the formulation of numerous human
rights instruments influenced the issuance of the INS Guidelines, these instruments are
rarely, if ever, cited in gender-based asylum determinations. In contrast, Canadian adjudications of gender-based asylum claims often refer to human rights instruments as a basis of
granting asylum. See Anker et al., supra note 24, at 1182-84.
107. 191. & N. Dec. 211 (BIA 1985), overruled in part by Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. &
N. Dec. 439 (BIA 1987). In Matter of Acosta, the BIA held that the same standard should
apply when adjudicating withholding of deportation and asylum claims. However, in
Matter of Mogharrabi, the BIA held that different standards should apply, thereby overruling that part of the Acosta decision.
108. Id. at 222.
109. Id.
110. Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102, 107 (9th Cir. 1969) (citing WEBSTER'S TmRD NEW
OOERNATIONALDICTIONARY 1685 (1965)).
111. Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 516 (9th Cir. 1985).
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time or increase in intensity so that they may rise to the level of persecution.,,,112
These defmitions of persecution provide a general framework in which
harm can be evaluated to determine if it rises to the requisite level of persecution. l13 All instances of abuse or harm, whether gender-based or not, must
be evaluated according to the general principles discussed in the preceding
paragraph. If the applicant cannot demonstrate that the harm she fears or
has suffered is commensurate with one of the general principles, her asylum
claim may be denied. 114 Therefore, the INS Guidelines note that although
there are particular types of harm which are "unique to or commonly befall
women," the analysis of abuse should not differ because of the victim's gender.lIS
1. Non-Conformance with Moral Codes as Persecution
In the area of violations of fundamental beliefs as persecution, courts
have taken significant steps towards developing gender-based asylum case
law. The INS Guidelines acknowledge these steps by discussing two cases
which were adjudicated in the Third and Ninth circuits. Both Fatin 1I6 and
Fisher 1I7 involved Iranian women who feared persecution upon return to
Iran because of their opposition to the restrictive Islamic laws imposed on
women by the Khomeini government. In Fatin, the Third Circuit held that
the punishment for non-compliance with the moral code constituted persecution for the purposes of any asylum claim. I IS The court also found that
"the concept of persecution is broad enough to include governmental
measures that compel an individual to engage in conduct that is not physi112. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 9 (citing INS BASIC LAw MANUAL, supra note 29, at
22).
113. Cj. Proposed Guidelines, supra note 51, at 816 (providing a much more expansive
definition of what forms of harm constitute persecution).
114. Because these definitions derive from cases which involved male applicants, genderbased claims often cannot fit within these constructs as the interpretations are based on a
particularly male experience. The Proposed Guidelines provide a more expansive interpretation of persecution which would be more inclusive of gender-based harm. For example, the Proposed Guidelines state that persecution includes "other serious violations of
basic human rights as defined by international human rights instruments (including those
specifically addressing the rights of women)." Id. International human rights instruments
can provide a "framework for analyzing which types of harm amount to persecution." Id.
at 816 n.21. ''These human rights instruments need not be ratified by the U.S. to provide
guidance as a source of human rights norms." Id. (citing INS BASIC LAw MANUAL, supra
note 29, at 11-12, 20). See also supra notes 30-45 and accompanying text (examples and
discussion of human rights instruments specifically addressing the rights of women).
115. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 9.
116. Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233 (3d Cir. 1993).
117. Fisher v. INS, 61 F.3d 1366 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd en bane, 79 F.3d 955 (9th Cir.
1996). See infra notes 308-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of the en banc decision.
118. The applicant's brief stated that the routine penalty for women who do not comply
with the moral code is "74 lashes, a year's imprisonment, and in many cases, brutal rapes
and death." Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1241.

280

HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 8:2

cally painful or harmful but is abhorrent to that individual's deepest beliefs.,,1l9 The court further explained that such conduct could be exemplified by "requiring a person to renounce his or her religious beliefs or to
desecrate an object of religious importance.,,120
Despite these findings, the Third Circuit determined that the record did
not demonstrate that Ms. Fatin would risk persecution. Rather, she failed
to demonstrate that she would risk the consequences of non-compliance, or
that the imposition of the religious laws would be "so profoundly abhorrent" to her beliefs that it would constitute persecution. 121 Although the
court failed to specify what degree of "abhorrence" is required to constitute persecution, it did explain that the level of abhorrence cannot be based
solely on the subjective reactions of the applicant, but must be objectively
reasonable. 122 The Third Circuit also asserted that "the concept of persecution does not encompass all treatment that our society regards as unfair,
unjust, or even unlawful or unconstitutional.,,123 Because Ms. Fatin failed
to establish that she had a valid fear of future persecution, her asylum
claim was denied. However, Fatin's importance to gender-based asylum
jurisprudence is undeniable because of the court's permissive definition of
persecution.
In Fisher, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Third Circuit's interpretations
of persecution. 124 The applicant in Fisher was an Iranian woman who
feared persecution based on her refusal to comply with the fundamentalist
religious and cultural norms. Although the Ninth Circuit distinguished the
two cases by stating that Fisher "involves a claim of persecution based
upon forced compliance of the moral codes, not a claim that voluntary
compliance itself amounts to persecution,,,125 the court affirmed the Third
Circuit's interpretation of persecution in Fatin. According to the Ninth
Circuit:
when a person with religious views different from those espoused
by a religious regime is required to conform to, or is punished for
failing to comply with, laws that fundamentally are abhorrent to
that person's deeply-held religious convictions, the resulting anguish should be considered in determining whether the authorities
have engaged in "extreme conduct" that is "tantamount to perse-

119. Id. at 1242.
120. Id.
121. Id. See infra notes 176-85 and accompanying text for further discussion of the case
and the author's criticism of this decision.
122. Id. at 1242 n.l1. The INS Guidelines explain that the degree of abhorrence would
have to be shared by a reasonable person in the circumstances of the applicant. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 10.
123. Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1240.
124. Fisher, 61 F.3d at 1375-76.
125. Id. at 1375.
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tion."I26
The Fisher court also emphasized that persecution cannot be defmed so
narrowly as to be "evaluated solely on the basis of the physical sanction ...
imposed .... ,,127 By creating two new interpretations of persecution which
can be utilized by other women applicants to formulate their gender-based
asylum claims, these cases represent significant developments in the area of
gender-based asylum law. The INS Guidelines' discussion of these two
cases implies that persecution for non-compliance with moral codes constitutes a violation of fundamental beliefs, thereby satisfying the persecution
element of asylum.

2. Severe Abuse as Persecution
Severe abuse which is generally specific to women, such as rape and
other forms of sexual violence, will often be considered persecution under
the general framework as well. In line with at least two major cases on the
subject, the INS Guidelines assert that rape and severe sexual violence are
commensurate with serious physical harm which has consistently been held
to constitute persecution. In Lazo-Majano v. INS,I28 the Ninth Circuit held
that an army sergeant's rape and brutalization of a Salvadoran woman who
he denounced as a subversive constituted persecution within the terms of the
Refugee Act. Similarly, in In re D-V-, 129 the BIA held that the gang rape
and beating of a Haitian women amounted to persecution. Severe sexual
abuse can also be deemed equivalent to torture, beatings, and other forms of
physical abuse which are commonly interpreted to be persecution. l30 Despite these auspicious interpretations, it is generally not the persecution itself
that the women applicants have difficulty proving in cases involving rape or
sexual violence.
Demonstrating that sexual abuse amounts to persecution under the general principles does not by itself provide grounds for asylum. Asylumseekers must still establish that their fear is well-founded, on account of one
of the enumerated grounds, and that the persecutor is the government or
someone the government is unable or unwilling to control. 131 If the persecution that a woman faces is deemed personal, then she generally fails to satisfy the requirement that her persecution be on account of a protected

126. Id.
127. Id. at 1374. The INS Guidelines failed to mention that the Fisher court also held
that the likelihood of sanctions for inadvertent non-compliance with the moral codes is
sufficient to establish a well-founded fear of persecution. Id. at 1376.
128. 813 F.2d 1432, 1434 (9th Cir. 1987).
129. In re D-V-, Int. Dec. 3252 (BIA 1993) was designated as a precedent the same
month the INS Guidelines were issued.
130. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 9.
131. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
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ground, and thus is not eligible for asylum. 132
Significantly, the INS Guidelines instruct Asylum Officers not to automatically assume that sexual violence is a purely personal act. 133 However,
the Guidelines fail to elaborate on this instruction. The Guidelines do not
explain why an adjudicator would automatically assume that sexual violence
perpetrated against a woman is purely personal. For instance, when a man
is beaten, is it automatically assumed that the beating was for purely personal reasons? Furthermore, the Guidelines do not inform the Asylum Officers why they should not jump to this conclusion. If they are not provided
with any context, how will Asylum Officers know when their assumptions
are inappropriate. If the INS Guidelines had delineated in what situations it
is appropriate to fmd that the persecution was personal, and in what situations it was not, the instruction above would have been more useful.
3. Past Persecution
While the INS Guidelines outline several ways to establish asylum
claims based upon a well-founded fear of future persecution, they fail to discuss the significance of an asylum claim based on past persecution. The
Guidelines should emphasize that past persecution alone does not constitute
eligibility for asylum; other requirements must still be met. In addition to
demonstrating that the abuse suffered amounts to persecution on account of
one of the protected grounds, a female applicant for asylum based on past
persecution must also establish that the persecutor was the government or
someone the government was unable or unwilling to control. 134 Once an
applicant establishes that the harm she suffered in the past amounts to persecution, the INS then bears the burden of showing by a preponderance of
the evidence that conditions in the country from which the applicant fled
have substantially changed. 135 To establish fundamentally changed country
conditions, the Asylum Officer should supply independent evidence. 136
4. The Case Law Defining/Recognizing Gender-Based Persecution
The INS is not entirely at fault for the absence of detailed guidance regarding evaluating what types of gender-based abuse constitutes persecution
for purposes of satisfying the statute. Unfortunately, the extant case law
often does not contain uniform precedents which can be employed by women
refugees basing their asylum claims on gender persecution. Further development of the gender-based asylum case law is necessary for female appli-

132. See infra notes 270-91 and accompanying text.
133. See INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 9.
134. See, e.g., Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1987); In re D-V-, Int. Dec.
3252 (BIA 1993).
135. Proposed Guidelines, supra note 51, at 821-22 nn.57-58. See also Kelly, supra note
12, at 636 n.45.
136. Proposed Guidelines, supra note 51, at 822 n.57.
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cants to succeed with claims submitted under this rubric. Applicants' ability
to meet the refugee defmition requirements is often hindered due to a dearth
of precedential cases in the area of gender persecution. Although recent decisions have contributed towards a growing body of law, inconsistencies in
that law are still pervasive.137 It was hoped that the INS Guidelines would
create a unifying force in the area of gender-based asylum. Rather than
providing the guidance that was anticipated, the INS Guidelines, merelyemphasize the limitations in current case law.138 Although the Guidelines are
an extremely positive development, the case law must evolve to further facilitate the fair adjudication of gender-based asylum claims.
B. THE "ON ACCOUNT OF" REQUlREMENT 139
Once an applicant demonstrates that the harm she fears or has suffered
in the past rises to the requisite level of persecution, she must then establish
that the persecution is on account of race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion. Applicants fleeing genderbased persecution often fmd this requirement of the refugee defmition to be
the most difficult to satisfy.l40 Because the "key criteria for being a refugee
are drawn primarily from the realm of public sphere activities dominated by
men,,,141 the activities of women in the private sphere have been historically'
ignored. 142 Thus, state persecution of a religious or political minority is
137. See, e.g., Matter of A- and Z-, A72-190-893, A72-793-219 (U Arlington, Va.
Dec. 20, 1994), reported in IJ Grants Asylum to Woman Based on Spousal Abuse, INS
Guidelines Imminent, supra note 25, at 521 (recognizing spousal abuse as persecution for
asylum purposes); Matter ofM- K-, A72-374-558 (U Arlington, Va. Aug. 9, 1995), reported in IJ Grants Asylum on the Basis of Persecution Relating to Female Genital Mutilation, supra note 3, at 1188 (recognizing female genital mutilation and spousal abuse as
grounds for asylum eligibility). But see More on IJ Decision Granting Asylum Based on
Genital Mutilation, supra note 5, at 1265 (discussing gender-based asylum case in which
U denied asylum application holding female genital mutilation did not constitute persecution for purposes of asylum).
138. See INS Publishes Gender Persecution Guidelines, 72 INTERPRETER RELEASES 771
(1995) ("Ms. Beasley cautioned that the INS guidelines to some extent emphasize the
limitations in current case law, while the 1994 proposed guidelines supported an expansive reading of the case law.").
139. The INS Guidelines only discuss two of the five grounds of asylum, political opinion
and membership in a particular social group. Although these are the two grounds under
which most gender-based asylum claims will be presented, this comment will discuss all
five grounds because gender-based claims can conceivably be brought under all of them.
Proposed Guidelines, supra note 51, at 817-21.
140. "[W]omen are much less likely than men to be found to meet the eligibility criteria
for refugee status because of the absence of explicit recognition of gender based persecution, and because of the social and political context in which the claims of women are adjudicated." Kelly, supra note 12, at 627. Some asylum advocates have called for the addition of a 6th category for gender in the refugee definition. See id. at 627 n.7; Kristin E.
Kandt, Note, United States Asylum Law: Recognizing Persecution Based on Gender Using
Canada as a Comparison, 9 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 137 (1995).
141. Kelly, supra note 12, at 628.
142. [d. at 627-28.
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grounds for asylum, whereas gender persecution at home is not. 143
The INS Guidelines acknowledge the difficulty of satisfying the "on account of' element when presenting gender-based claims,l44 but emphasize
that this component is "a critical part of the analysis under U.S. law.,,145
Despite this emphasis, the Guidelines tend to discuss this element generally
rather than specifically. For example, the INS Guidelines generally explain
that satisfaction of the "on account of' element requires that the persecution
must be "inflicted in order to punish the victim for having one or more of the
characteristics protected under the statute."l46 However, the Guidelines do
not provide enough specific examples of persecution women may face on
account of one or more of the protected categories which would satisfy the
requirements of the statute.

1. Race, Nationality and Religion
The INS Guidelines fail to discuss or even mention claims presented by
women applicants who face persecution on account of their race, nationality
or religion. There is no case law known to this author specifically addressing gender-based persecution on account of race or nationality. However,
there are several significant cases in the gender-based asylum area regarding
persecution on account of religion that should have been discussed in the
Guidelines. 147 The fact that the Proposed Guidelines, Canadian Guidelines, and the UNHCR Guidelines all specify possible gender-based asylum
claims which can arise on account of race, religion, and nationality indicates
that this is yet another oversight by the INS.
Unlike the INS Guidelines, the Proposed Guidelines and the Canadian
Guidelines both recognize certain situations where a woman may allege fear
of persecution or past persecution on account of her race and her gender. 148
For example, an indigenous woman may be persecuted for her race as well
as her gender. 149 Additionally, in circumstances where a discriminatory law
"causes a woman to lose her citizenship because of marriage to a foreign

143. Id. at 628.
144. Unlike the Canadian Guidelines, the INS Guidelines do not attempt to ameliorate
this problem by creating a structure which enables female applicants to formulate a claim
which fits within one of the 5 grounds. The Canadian Guidelines created an analytical
framework for gender-based asylum claims which adjudicators can employ to determine if
the applicant's claim falls within one of the five enumerated categories. See CANADIAN
GUIDELINES, supra note 46, at 2-6.
145. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 10.
146. Id. See also Acosta, 191. & N. Dec. at 226.
147. See supra notes 116-27 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 156-74 and accompanying text.
148. Proposed Guidelines, supra note 51, at 818 (citing CANADIAN GUIDEUNES, supra
note 46, at 4). The Canadian Guidelines provide the example of an Asian woman living in
an African society who may be persecuted because of her race and her gender. CANADIAN
GUIDELINES, supra note 46, at 4.
149. Proposed Guidelines, supra note 51, at 818.

, ·f-'R··
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national or other related actions," a gender-based asylum claim of persecution or fear of persecution on account of nationality may exist. 150
The Proposed Guidelines and the Canadian Guidelines also acknowledge that in some cultures, women may face persecution on account of their
particular religious practices or beliefs. "In the context of the refugee definition, the concept of religion may encompass the freedom to hold a belief
system of one's choice or not to hold a particular belief system, and the
freedom to practice,a religion of one's choice or not to practice a prescribed
religion. ,,151 Women may be subjected to harm on account of their refusal to
practice a prescribed religion, hold particular beliefs, or conform their behavior according to the teachings of the prescribed religion. 152
The Proposed Guidelines explain that in nations where there is no separation of church and state or where the government is a theocracy, women
may face persecution on account of their religion because they choose not to
follow the tenets of the prescribed religion. 153 A woman who fails to "fulfill
her assigned role" and fears persecutory retaliation, may be able to establish
a claim for asylum based on religious persecution. l54 As stated above in relation to race, women can also face persecution on account of their religion
and their gender. For example, a woman may fear harm due to her religious
beliefs, and the type of harm or punishment she fears may be genderspecific, such as rape. Similarly, a woman who does not comply with a religious law which is directed only at women, may face persecution on account of her gender and her religion. 155
The failure of the INS Guidelines to discuss the persecution of women
on account of race, nationality, or religion should not be interpreted as an
indication of an absence of case law on these issues. In fact, recent decisions in the United States have contributed significantly to the development
of gender-based asylum law, specifically in relation to the enforcement of
moral codes against women in Muslim Fundamentalist societies. 156 In Hartooni v. INS,157 the applicant's claim was based on a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of religion. Ms. Hartooni was a practicing Armenian Christian living in Iran. 15S Not only did she face persecution on account
of her religion but also on account of her gender. The Ninth Circuit noted
that at the time of Ms. Hartooni's application for political asylum, Christian
150. Id.
151. Id. See also CANADIAN GUIDELINES, supra note 46, at 4.
152. Proposed Guidelines, supra note 51, at 818.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. In this example, the woman's religious beliefs may be contrary to the prescribed religion and thus compel her non-compliance. See infra notes 168-74 and accompanying text
(discussing the three judge panel's decision in Fisher v.INS).
156. Notably, all three cases were adjudicated in the Ninth Circuit.
157. 21 F.3d 336 (9th Cir. 1994).
158. Id. at 339.
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Armenians living in Iran were presumably eligible for asylum under State
Department policy. 159 The court required Ms. Hartooni to provide evidence
of "general persecution of a protected group,,,I60 as well as to "demonstrate
'a specific inference of personal danger. ",161
Ms. Hartooni not only faced attacks directed at her on account of her
religion, 162 but she also faced harm due to her gender. On two occasions the
applicant was detained by soldiers because her hair was not properly bound
according to the religious laws. 163 On the fIrst occasion, Ms. Hartooni was
threatened with prison if she was caught with her hair improperly bound
again. l64 Although she managed to escape from the soldiers on the second
occasion, some of her friends were "taken away for a few days.,,165 Thus as
a person practicing a religion different from that prescribed by the government, Ms. Hartooni was singled out for persecution on account of her religion.
Furthermore, as a female forced to comply with laws directed only at
her gender or suffer the consequences of non-compliance,l66 Ms. Hartooni
also faced gender-related persecution. However, the court did not designate
these incidents as gender-related. Rather, the court stated "[w]e need not
here decide whether these latter items were religious in character.,,167 The
court's failure to defme these "latter items" as gender-related exemplifies a
consistent problem in developing gender-based asylum law. Courts often
adhere to the traditional asylum constructs, which are based on male claimants rather than interpreting or clarifying the law to be more receptive to
gender-persecuted claimants.
In yet another important case, the Ninth Circuit held in Fisher v. INS
that enforcement of moral codes upon Iranian women can constitute persecution on account of religion. 168 Ms. Fisher argued "that the moral codes
159. Id. at 341. "By virtue of their faith alone, Christian Armenians in Iran demonstrated
a well-founded fear of persecution within the meaning of the 1951 Convention and 1967
Protocol." Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. (citing Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509,515-16 (9th Cir. 1985».
162. For example, the Armenian Christian school that Ms. Hartooni attended was closed
by the government; she was not allowed to celebrate Christmas; and Iranian soldiers stoned
Ms. Hartooni's church while she was inside. Id. at 341.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Failing to comply with the moral codes can result in punishment which includes "74
lashes, a year's imprisonment, and in many cases brutal rapes and death." Fatin v. INS, 12
F.3d 1233, 1241 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting applicant's brief). See supra notes 116-27 and
accompanying text (discussing whether non-compliance with moral codes constitutes persecution).
167. Hartooni, 21 F.3d at 341.
168. Fisher v. INS, 61 F.3d 1366, 1376-77 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd en bane, 79 F.3d 955
(9th Cir. 1996). For a discussion of the en bane panel's reversal of this decision, see infra
notes 308-31 and accompanying text.
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are persecutory because they represent a conception of Islam that she fmds
abhorrent and because the regime is attempting to suppress her beliefs
through sanctioning her for noncompliance with the moral codes. ,,169 Contrary to previous asylum cases based on the enforcement of moral codes as
persecution on account of membership in a particular social group,170 Ms.
Fisher claimed her persecution was on account of her religion. I71 Because
her conception of Islam differed considerably from the government's, Ms.
Fisher argued that imposing a conception of Islam on her that she fmds abhorrent constituted persecution on account of her religion. l72 The court accepted her argument but instructed that to demonstrate persecution on account of religion, Ms. Fisher must show "that the moral codes are likely to
be enforced against her because of the authorities' intent to punish her for
her actual or imputed beliefs.,,173 Moreover, the court asserted that Ms.
Fisher need not inform the Iranian regime of her opposing views to establish
that she will purposely fail to comply with the moral codes. 174
Despite these important case developments, the INS Guidelines do not
even discuss these cases or the issues raised in them. The failure to acknowledge case law regarding persecution on account of religion and the
possibility of persecution on account of race and nationality represents one
of the many significant deficiencies inherent in the INS Guidelines.
2. Actual or Imputed Political Opinion
In addition to raising claims of persecution on account of race, nationality, or religion, gender-based asylum applicants also may raise claims of
persecution on account of political opinion. The applicant's political opinion may be one which is her own, such as feminism, or a persecutor may
impute a political opinion to her that she does not in actuality possess. The
Proposed Guidelines assert that "the term political opinion should be understood to include an opinion regarding the treatment or status of women

169. Id. at 1374.
170. Ms. Fisher, as well as the applicants in Safaie v. INS, 25 F.3d 636 (8th Cir. 1994)
and Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233 (3d Cir. 1993), based their claims on persecution on account of political opinion.
171. "Fisher does not maintain that her voluntary compliance with the moral codes would
amount to persecution. . . . Rather, she contends that the moral codes are persecutory because they represent a conception of Islam that she finds abhorrent and because the regime
is attempting to suppress her beliefs through sanctioning her for noncompliance with the
moral codes." Fisher, 61 F.3d at 1374.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1377.
174. /d. "As the Fifth Circuit noted recently, to require 'martyrdom' is to 'ignore reality in
general and reasonable human behavior in particular. '" Id. (citing Revis-Martinez v. INS,
997 F.2d 1143, 1147 (5th Cir. 1993». Cf. Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1241 (finding that petitioner's
testimony did not bring petitioner within social group of Iranian women who refuse to conform with Islamic religious requirements).

288

HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 8:2

within [their] country, culture or social, religious or ethnic groUp.,,175 In
contrast to persecution on account of race, nationality, or religion, the INS
Guidelines do acknowledge and discuss persecution on account of both actual and imputed political opinion as a basis for asylum. However, their
treatment of this basis for asylum is cursory at best and excludes case law
which is particularly relevant to this area.
a. Political Opinion
In Fatin v. INS, the Third Circuit had "little doubt that feminism qualifies as a political opinion within the meaning of the relevant statutes.,,176
The court also stated 'that political opinion could be given a narrower defmition such as "the opinion that Iran's 'gender-specific laws and repressive
social norms' must be disobeyed on grounds of conscience.,,177 Despite
these two progressive holdings, the court denied Ms. Fatin's asylum claim.
Although she demonstrated that she was a feminist, she failed to show that
the harm a woman may face for being a feminist in Iran rose to the level of
persecution. 178 According to the court, Ms. Fatin also failed to demonstrate
that she possessed the narrower political opinion that Iran's repressive social
norms and gender-specific laws must be disobeyed. 179 The Third Circuit
held that while Ms. Fatin did demonstrate that the punishment she would
face for disobedience constituted persecution, she failed to show that she intended non-compliance. I80
The INS Guidelines claim that regardless of the outcome, Fatin "does
make clear that an applicant who could demonstrate a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of her (or his) beliefs about the role and status of
women in society could be eligible for refugee status on account of political
opinion. ,,181 However, despite the veracity of this statement, it ignores the
reality of the inherent difficulty in presenting gender-based asylum claims.
The holding in Fatin can be perceived as being purely arbitrary. Ultimately,
175. Proposed Guidelines, supra note 51, at 817.
176. Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1242.
177. Id. at 1243.
178. Id. Ms. Fatin's brief contained a passage detailing the consequences of not wearing a
veil in public. "In April 1983, the government adopted a law imposing one year's imprisonment on any women caught in public without the traditional Islamic veil, the Chador.
However, from reports, it is clear that in many instances the revolutionary guards. " take
the law into their own hands and abuse the transgressing women." Id. at 1237.
Despite evidence that feminists in Iran manifest their opposition to traditional Islamic
law by not wearing a veil, and that such action can subject women to abuse, the Fatin Court,
nevertheless, limited its decision by holding that maintaining a feminist political opinion in
Iran does not rise to the level of persecution. The Fatin Court's decision reflects the concern of other courts with going "too far" in their development of gender-based asylum law.
See, e.g., Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1991); Campos-Guardado v. INS, 809 F.2d
285 (5th Cir. 1987); Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
179. Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1243.
180. Id.
181. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 11.

Fall 1997]

GENDER-BASED ASYLUM

289

whether Ms. Fatin' s asylum claim would be approved or denied was dependent solely on her statements regarding whether or not she would wear
the veil. When asked by the Immigration Judge whether she would wear the
veil or submit to arrest and punishment, Ms. Fatin stated "[i]f I go back, I
would try personally to avoid it as much as I could."ls2 Because she was not
defInitive enough in her refusal to wear the veil, her asylum claim was denied. IS3 It appears from the court's holding that if Ms. Fatin had said, "I
would rather submit to arrest and punishment than wear the veil," then her
asylum claim would have been granted. Thus, a mere alteration in words
could have resulted in a significantly different result. l84
Although the Fatin Court developed important dicta regarding genderbased claims, it ultimately sent a woman back to persecution because she
was reluctant to become a martyr. ISS The holding in this case further exemplifIes the problems with current gender-based asylum law, which include
many decisions that may provide important dicta, but not precedents which
can be cited as authority by subsequent gender-based asylum claimants. By
providing a cursory summary of these cases, the INS Guidelines only emphasize, rather than alleviate, such shortcomings.
b. Imputed Political Opinion
In addition to discussing political opinion, the INS Guidelines make an
important concession by recognizing imputed political opinion as a basis for
asylum. However, their discussion of imputed political opinion falls short of
being truly effective by failing to mention notable holdings which specifically address this area of gender-based asylum law. Instead, the INS
Guidelines merely instruct that "in addition to the question whether views on
issues that relate to gender can constitute a 'political opinion' under the
INA," Asylum Officers also must evaluate claims in which women assert
that they have been persecuted on account of the political opinion that was
imputed to them by their persecutor. IS6

182. Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1236.
183. Cf, Fisher v. INS, 61 F.3d at 1377 ("Of course, just as Fisher need not show that she
purposefully will fail to comply with moral codes, it is not necessary for her to intend to
make her views known to the Iranian regime.").
184. Cf, Moghaddam v. INS, No. 93-70854, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 37066 (9th Cir. Dec.
16, 1994) (holding "enforcement of the moral codes to suppress either religious or political
beliefs may be persecution;" applicants do not need to take conscious steps to violate the
moral codes to meet burden of well-founded fear of persecution).
185. See Fisher, 61 F.3d at 1377 ("[T]o require 'martyrdom' is to 'ignore reality in general
and reasonable human behavior in particular."'); see also Pamela Goldberg, U.S. Law and
Women Asylum Seekers: Where Are They and Where Are They Going?, 73 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 889, 894 (1996) ("The fallacy in the Fatin ... decision is that an individual must
show that she would 'choose to suffer the severe consequences of noncompliance' in order
to establish the depth of her conviction. Nowhere else in asylum law has an applicant been
required to meet such a high standard.").
186. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 11.
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The INS selected Campos-Guardado v. INS 187 to illustrate the imputed
political opinion doctrine to its Officers. 188 The Fifth Circuit denied the
applicant's claim of persecution on account of imputed political opinion
concluding that she failed to establish that her persecutors imputed a political opinion to her which motivated their attack. Notably, the INS Guidelines state "[r]easonable minds could differ over this record" considering the
facts which indicated that the persecutors "believed the petitioner to have
contrary political views and that they punished her because of [them].,,189
The INS concedes that this case illustrates the need for Asylum Officers to
"carefully ascertain all the facts surrounding an allegation of persecution in
order to assess whether there are indicia that the act was committed or
threatened on account of a protected characteristic."I90
Although the INS provides a generous interpretation of CamposGuardado in its Guidelines, it fails to discuss or even mention other relevant
case law regarding imputed political opinion. For instance, there is no mention of Lazo-Majano v. INS,191 decided by the Ninth Circuit the same year
the Fifth Circuit decided Campos-Guardado, but with remarkably different
results. The decision issued by the Ninth Circuit in Lazo-Majano marked a
significant development in gender-based asylum law. The court held that the
persecutor's "cynical" imputation of a subversive political opinion to the
applicant constituted persecution on account of political opinion. 192 By imputing his unsubstantiated belief that the applicant was a subversive, the
persecutor subjected Ms. Lazo-Majano to severe abuse and caused her to
fear further persecution in the future. 193 The Ninth Circuit emphasized that
"[o]ne cannot have a more compelling example of a political opinion generating political persecution than the opinion that is held by a subversive in
opposition to the govemment."l94 Although the sergeant knew that Ms.
Lazo-Majano was not a subversive, but only "a poor domestic and washerwoman," he SUbjected her to constant persecution by imputing a political
opinion to her. 195 By leaving this case out of its discussion of imputed political opinion, the INS prevents information from reaching the Asylum Officers that may be crucial to women's asylum claims.
Unlike the INS Guidelines, the Proposed Guidelines provide specific
examples of women who may be persecuted on account of a political belief
187. 809 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1987). See supra note 2 and accompanying text for a brief
synopsis of the facts.
188. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 11.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. 813 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1987). See supra note 1 and accompanying text for a brief
synopsis of the facts.
192. Id. at 1435.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
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ascribed to them. l96 A woman who refuses to subordinate herself to the
cultural or social dominance of men in her society or who criticizes institutionalized discrimination against women may fear persecution on account of
her actual or imputed political opinion. l97 The Proposed Guidelines explain
that the political opinion may be attributed to her if "she is perceived by the
established politicaVsocial structure as expressing politically antagonistic
views through her actions or her failure to act.,,198 Furthermore, political
opinions may be imposed "for any reason, including her refusal or inability
to conform to religious or cultural norms or the roles assigned to women
within her country or culture."I99
The imputed political opinion claim presented by the applicant in Fisher
v. INS200 would aptly fall under this defmition provided in the Proposed
Guidelines. In that case, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a "'totality of the
circumstances' approach is a viable means of demonstrating persecution on
account of an imputed political opinion. ,,201 Ms. Fisher argued that a
"combination of factors" indicated that the government's interest in her was
politically motivated. 202 These factors included her brother-in-Iaw's known
opposition to the regime and her own record of noncompliance with the
moral codes.203 The court acknowledged that because of the recorded violations of the moral code "the authorities are likely to impute to Fisher 'enemy
of the regime' status.,,204 Thus, if Ms. Fisher can show on remand that she
would be viewed as an "enemy of the regime," her asylum claim of persecution on account of imputed political persecution may be granted. 205
The INS Guidelines' abbreviated discussion of imputed political opinion
demonstrates again the inherent shortcomings of the Guidelines themselves
and the gender-based asylum case law. The INS' failure to include LazoMajano 206 in its imputed political opinion analysis constitutes a disturbing
deficiency. A comparison of Lazo-Majano and Campos-Guardado'11J7 further illustrates the inconsistencies in the law. The Ninth Circuit appears to
be consistent in its treatment of imputed political opinion, but this consistency will only benefit women applicants who file claims within the reach of
this Circuit. Because the BIA and Immigration Judges are bound by the
precedents in the Circuit in which they are located, this can result in BIA
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

See Proposed Guidelines, supra note 51, at 817-18.
Id.
Id. (citing CANADIAN GUIDELINES, supra note 46, at 4).
Id.
61 F.3d 1366.
Id. at 1378.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
813 F.2d 1432.
809 F.2d 285.
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judges also issuing conflicting opinions. BIA precedents, United States Supreme Court decisions, or a change in the underlying law appear to provide
the best means of creating a uniform body of gender-based asylum law. 208

3. Membership in a Particular Social Group
The last basis of asylum, membership in a particular social group, is a
difficult asylum claim on which to prevail because it is "the least clearly defmed ground for eligibility as a refugee.,,209 A specific defmition of the
phrase does not exist in either the INA or the regulations. 210 In Fatin, the
Third Circuit cited to numerous courts and commentators that have struggled to defme this category. 211 Although commentators have advocated for a
liberal reading of this asylum ground,212 the BIA adopted a more restrictive
analysis 213 in Matter of Acosta. 214 In that case, the BIA defmed membership
in a particular group as "persecution that is directed toward an individual
who is a member of a group of persons all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic. ,,215 The shared characteristic can be either innate, such
as sex, kinship ties, or color, or a shared past experience such as land ownership or military leadership.216 The BIA also instructed that the group
characteristic that will qualify "remains to be determined on a case-by-case
basis.,,217 The shared characteristic must be one that either the members
cannot change or should not be required to change because it is fundamental
to their identity or conscience. 218
The INS Guidelines adopt the defmition of membership in a particular
social group provided by the BIA in Matter of Acosta as well as the Ninth
Circuit's test in Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS. 219 In Sanchez-Trujillo, the Ninth
Circuit developed a four-prong test to evaluate claims premised on membership in a particular social groUp.22O The adjudicator must determine:
208. For a discussion of recent decisions on gender-based asylum claims, see infra notes
307-72 and accompanying text.
209. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 12.
210. Kelly, supra note 12, at 647.
211. Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1238 nn.4-5.
212. ''The intent of the framers of the Refugee Convention was not to redress prior persecution of social groups, but rather to save individuals from future injustice. The 'social
group' category was meant to be a catch-all which could include all the bases for and types
of persecution which an imaginative despot might conjure up." Kelly, supra note 12, at
647-48 (citing Arthur C. Helton, Persecution on Account of Membership in a Social Group
as a Basisfor Refugee Status, 15 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 39,41-42,45 (1983».
213. Kelly, supra note 12, at 648.
214. 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (BIA 1985), overruled in part by Matter of Mogharrabi, 191. &
N. Dec. 439 (BIA 1987).
215. Id. at 233. See also INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 12.
216. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. 801 F.2d 1572 (9th Cir. 1986).
220. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 12-13.
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1) whether the class of people identified by the asylum applicant is
cognizable as a particular social group under the applicable laws; 2)
whether the applicant qualifies as a member of the group; 3)
whether the group has in fact been targeted for persecution on account of the characteristics of the group members; and 4) whether
"special circumstances" are present that would justify regarding
mere membership in the group in itself as sufficient to recognize the
·
app1lcant
as a refu gee. 221

The INS Guidelines note that the special circumstances prong is applicable only when the applicant alleges mere membershif in the social group
as the basis for her well-founded fear of persecution. 22 In addition to providing the above defmitions, the INS Guidelines also instruct Asylum Officers that the particular social group category can overlap with claims predicated on the other categories, i.e. race, religion, political opinion, or
nationality.223
However, the INS does not delineate the requirements for establishing a
well-founded fear of future persecution. The "well-founded fear" standard
consists of both objective and subjective components. An applicant can
satisfy the subjective component through her credible testimony that she
genuinely fears persecution. 224 The objective component may be satisfied by
showing specific and credible evidence of facts supporting a reasonable fear
of persecution on the enumerated ground. 225 The burden is on the applicant
to meet this standard. 226 An applicant is not required to demonstrate that she
has been singled out for persecution to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. 227 Rather, to prevail on her claim, she can show that "there
is a pattern or practice of persecuting similarly situated women on account
of their membership in the particular social group to which the applicant

221. Id. at 13 (citing Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1574-75). Cj. Kelly, supra note 12, at
650 (defining the four criteria as: "1) a close affiliation between members of the group, 2) a
common impulse or interest upon which the affiliation is based, 3) a voluntary association,
and 4) the existence of a common trait by which group members are distinguishable from
the general population"). Once a discernible social group has been established, the adjudicator must further consider "whether the applicant has demonstrated that she is a member of
the group ... [and] that the group has, in fact, been targeted for persecution." Kelly, supra
note 12, at 650 n.120, (citing Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1574-75).
222. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 13. See also Kelly, supra note 12, at 650 n.l20
(discussing "special circumstances" requirement).
223. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 12. The INS Guidelines also cite to the UNHCR
Handbook's discussion of the particular social group category, explaining that the UNHCR
Handbook's example illustrates how a claim based on membership in a particular social
group could be construed as persecution on account of political opinion. Id. at 12 n.12.
224. Fisher, 61 F.3d at 1370 (citing Acewicz v. INS, 984 F.2d 1056, 1061 (9th Cir.
1993)).
225. Id.
226. Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.5 (1996)).
227. See Proposed Guidelines, supra note 51, at 816.
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belongs. ,,228
a. Social Group Defined by Gender
After providing a general defmition of "membership in a particular
group," the INS Guidelines discuss gender and family membership as a basis of a social group. An increasing number of women refugees present
asylum claims predicated on the membership in a particular social group
ground. The applicants assert that "gender, alone or along with other characteristics,,,229 can defme the particular social group of which they are a
member and because of this membership, they have suffered or will suffer
persecution.
The INS Guidelines note230 that although the Second Circuit has held
that gender alone cannot defme a particular social group,231 other circuits
have taken a different view. 232 In Gomez v. INS, the Second Circuit considered the application of a woman who claimed that she had been persecuted
on account of her membership in a particular social group of "women who
have been previously battered and raped by Salvadoran guerrillas.,,233 The
court rejected this formulation stating, "[p]ossession of broadly-based characteristics such as youth and gender will not by itself endow individuals with
membership in a particular social groUp.,,234 The INS Guidelines fail to
mention, however, that the Second Circuit limited its holding to the facts of
the case. Despite its rejection of Ms. Gomez' claim, the Second Circuit
stated, "we do not suggest that women who have been repeatedly and systematically brutalized by particular attackers cannot assert a well-founded
fear of persecution. ,,235 This statement implies that the holding was based on
the particular facts of the case and the applicant's failure to demonstrate a
well-founded fear of persecution, rather than a categorical denial of social
groups based on gender. 236
Although the INS Guidelines fail to note the limited holding in Gomez,
they do discuss other cases that differ from the Second Circuit's decision.
For example, the Third Circuit in Fatin found that Iranian women who fear
persecution because of their gender constitute a particular social group under the INA. 237 Ms. Fatin failed to show, however, that members of this

228. Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208. 13(b)(2)(i)). See also Brazilian, Iranian Gay Men
Granted Asylum, 72 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1310 (1995) (two homosexual males were
granted asylum on the basis of meeting the requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(i)).
229. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 13.
230. Id.
231. See Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1991).
232. See, e.g., Fatin, 12 F.3d 1233; Safaie v. INS, 25 F.3d 636 (8th Cir. 1994).
233. Gomez, 947 F.2d at 663.
234. Id. at 664. See also INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 13.
235. Gomez, 947 F.2d at 664.
236. See Proposed Guidelines, supra note 51, at 818-19 n.38.
237. Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1240. See also INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 13.
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group faced the requisite level of persecution based solely on their gender.238 The INS Guidelines also note that in a factually similar case, Safaie
v. INS, the Eighth Circuit239 appeared to hold that gender could not be a
defining characteristic of a particular social group. The applicant argued
that Iranian women are a particular social group by virtue of their innate
240
In
characteristic (their sex) and the harsh restrictions placed upon them.
Safaie, the Eighth Circuit rejected her argument asserting that "this category is overbroad, because no fact-finder could reasonably conclude that
all Iranian women [have] a well-founded fear of persecution based solely
on their gender.,,241 The INS Guidelines contend, however, that although
the court's statement may appear to reject gender as a defining characteristic of a social group, that was not it's actual intent. 242 Despite its
"imprecise language," the Safaie Court cited to the portion of Fatin which
recognized that gender is a viable "shared characteristic" under the INA. 243
Thus, as the INS Guidelines note, although some courts have recognized
particular social groups based on gender as a legal matter, there has been no
fmding as a factual matter that membership in this group can result in harm
which rises to the level of persecution.244 In contrast, the courts have recognized that gender combined with other characteristics can constitute a
particular social group which meets the refugee defmition. For example, in
Fatin, the court held that a narrower group, limited to women who would
rather risk persecution for noncompliance than conform to the moral codes,
could be deemed an eligible social group. 245 A woman possessing such beliefs that "might well be so fundamental to her identity or conscience" should
not be forced to change them.246 The court also found that the punishment
inflicted on members of this group is harsh enough to constitute persecution.247 The INS Guidelines conclude that the Fatin court recognized three
groups248 based solely on or in part on gender which could constitute a par-

238. Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1240.
239. Safaie, 25 F.3d 636.
240. Id. at 640.
241. Id.
242. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 13 n.13.
243. Id. As in Fatin, the applicant in Safaie failed to present evidence that demonstrated
that Iranian women would be singled out for persecution based on their gender alone.
244. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 13. Cj. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233 (defining
membership in a particular social group as a group of persons who share a common immutable characteristic such as sex).
245. Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1241, accord Safaie, 25 F.3d at 640.
246. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 14.
247. However, the applicants in Fatin and Sajaie failed to demonstrate that they were
members of this particular subgroup. Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1241; Safaie, 25 F.3d at 640.
248. The three groups include: a group based solely on gender; "a subgroup of Iranian
women who find their country's gender-specific laws offensive and do not wish to comply
with them," and "Iranian women whose opposition to Iran's gender-specific laws is so profound that they would disobey at serious peril." INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 14.
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ticular social group, but only one social group could satisfy all the requirements of the refugee defmition. 249
The INS Guidelines further instruct the Asylum Officers to consider
additional characteristics, likely to be recognized by persecutors, that
might combine with gender to define a particular social groUp.250 In
Gomez v. INs/ 51 the applicant combined the characteristic of gender with
the shared past experience252 of rape and battering at the hands of Salvadoran guerrillas. Yet, the Second Circuit denied her claim, "finding that
she had failed to produce evidence that persons in this group could be
identified as members by would-be persecutors and would be targeted for
further harm on the basis of their common characteristic-that is, having
been harmed by the guerrillas in the past.,,253
After the analysis of Gomez, the INS Guidelines end their discussion of
social groups defmed by gender. There are no instructions as to which characteristics might combine with gender to create a viable claim of asylum.
The INS Guidelines also fail to develop a framework which Asylum Officers
can utilize when adjudicating claims under the 'least clearly defmed' asylum
ground. The INS Guidelines' truncated discussion is most likely due in part
to the dearth of precedent setting cases in this area, further substantiating the
conclusion that the case law must evolve to create a legal environment in
which gender-based asylum claims can be adequately adjudicated.
b. Social Group Defined by Family Membership
The INS Guidelines note that in addition to social groups defmed by
gender, asylum seekers also allege claims of past or future persecution due
to a family relationship.254 In Matter of Acosta, the BIA instructed that
"kinship ties" can be a common characteristic creating a particular social
group under the INA. 255 In accordance with this holding, the First Circuit
held in Gebremichael v. INS256 that "[t]here can, in fact, be no plainer example of a social group based on common, identifiable and immutable characteristics than that of a nuclear family.,,257 The Gebremichael court points
249. That group was "the narrowest sub-group of Iranian women whose opposition to
Iran's gender-specific laws is so profound that they would disobey at serious peril." Id.
The INS Guidelines state that this holding is consistent with Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N.
Dec. at 233 (holding "sex" is an immutable characteristic), and with the UNHCR Executive Committee's 1993 Conclusion, supra note 45.
250. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 15.
251. 947 F.2d 660.
252. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
253. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 15 (citing Gomez, 947 F.2d at 664).
254. See INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 15.
255. 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233.
256. 10 F.3d 28 (lst Cir. 1993). The applicant in Gebremichael was an Ethiopian man
who was imprisoned and tortured by the Dergue government seeking information about his
brother.
257. Id. at 36.
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to the "time honored theory of cherchez La famille ('look for the family')"
employed by the applicant's persecutors which involves the "terrorization of
one family member to extract information about the location of another
family member or to force the family member to come forward.,,258 This
theory creates a clear link between family membership and persecution that
no reasonable fact-fmder could fail to notice. 259 In addition to discussing the
theory set forth in GebremichaeL, the INS Guidelines also instruct Asylum
Officers to consider the holding in Ravindran v. INS which stated: "a prototypical example of a 'particular social group' would consist of the immediate members of a certain family, the family being the focus of fundamental
affiliation concerns and common interests for most people.,,260
The INS Guidelines note that prior to these cases, the Ninth Circuit
found that persecution on account of membership in a particular social
group did not extend to the persecution of a family. 261 These divergent
holdings illustrate again the inconsistencies in the law. The First Circuit
recognizes the family as a particular social group for asylum purposes,
whereas the Ninth Circuit does not. However, the INS Guidelines state that
although the law may be uncertain in the Ninth Circuit, the BIA and other
federal courts have recognized family membership as a valid particular social group under the asylum laws. 262 The INS Guidelines also direct that
gender need not play any role in whether family membership can defme a
particular social groUp.263 Asylum Officers should be aware of the law in
this area because female applicants from countries where men tend to be
more politically active than women will often assert claims based on family
membership.264
Throughout its discussion on social groups defmed by family membership, surprisingly, the INS fails to discuss Campos-Guardado,265 in which
the Fifth Circuit denied the applicant's asylum claim based on imputed political opinion and membership in a particular social groUp.266 The court did
not consider the applicant's particular social group claim because it "relies
258. Id. (citations omitted).
259. Id.
260. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 15 (citing Ravindran v. INS, 976 F.2d 754, 761 n.5
(lst Cir. 1992) (quoting Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576».
261. See INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 15 (citing Estrada-Posadas v. INS, 924 F.2d
916,919 (9th Cir. 1991). The Ninth Circuit did not mention Sanchez-Trujillo in its decision nor did it explore the issue of a social group based on family membership in depth.
INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 15.
262. Id. at 15-16.
263. However, although the persecution may not be gender-based, it may be genderspecific. For example, the type of persecution inflicted on female family members may be
specific to their gender (i.e. rape). See, e.g., Campos-Guardado, 809 F.2d 285 (after being
forced to watch murder of relatives, applicant was raped).
264. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 16.
265. 809 F.2d 285.
266. Id. at 288. See supra note 2 and accompanying text for a brief synopsis of the facts.
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upon the attackers' alleged attribution of political opinions to the family
group, [thus] we focus on the scope of the statutory term 'political opinion. ",267 Despite the facts of the case which indicate a viable claim of persecution on account of the applicant's family membership, the court does not
even review the issue. 268 A comparison of Campos-Guardado and Gebremichael would have been useful to instruct the Asylum Officers that Campos-Guardado, as the INS recognized previously, may not be a case on
which Asylum Officers should rely because "reasonable minds could differ"
over the record.
Although a large portion of the INS Guidelines are devoted to the category of membership in a particular social group, there are many deficiencies
in its analysis. Relevant cases are not cited and a framework by which
Asylum Officers could approach these claims is not provided. The INS
Guidelines merely seem to point out the complexities of claims in this area
and the inconsistencies in the case law. In contrast, both the Proposed
Guidelines and the Canadian Guidelines provide a framework and considerations for adjudicators to utilize when evaluating claims based on membership in a particular social group. 269 A more structured approach in the
INS Guidelines would provide a useful mechanism which Asylum Officers
could employ to perform more efficient and uniform adjudications.

C.

PUBLICVS. PRIVATE ACTS

Mter establishing that she has faced past persecution or has a wellfounded fear of future persecution on account of one of the enumerated
grounds, the applicant must still satisfy two further requirements. She must
demonstrate that 1) the agent of persecution was either the government or
someone the government is unwilling or unable to control; and 2) that government protection is not available in another part of the country. The INS
Guidelines note that these two requirements are "based on the notion that
international protection becomes appropriate where national protection is
unavailable. ,,270 Thus, if an applicant is not adequately protected by her
government, then she has the right to seek protection elsewhere and be
granted asylum if she satisfies the requirements of the refugee defmition.
Case law has interpreted inadequate p~otection to mean, in part, that the persecution is inflicted by the government or by someone the government is

267. Id.
268. Id. at 287.
269. See CANADIAN GUIDEUNES, supra note 46, at 5-7; Proposed Guidelines, supra note
51, at 818-21. The Proposed Guidelines' extensive analysis of the membership in a particular social group asylum category is derived from an expansive reading of the case law.
It provides a framework which is receptive to gender-based asylum claims and which
supplies a more useful and instructive tool for Asylum Officers to utilize in their adjudications.
270. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 16.
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unwilling or unable to control. 271
The INS Guidelines state that in the "usual case" the persecutor will be
the government. 272 However, this "usual case" is using the male model of
asylum cases and is not necessarily reflective of asylum claims presented by
women refugees. Gender-based asylum claims often involve persecution by
non-governmental figures such as spouses,273 family members ,274 and guerrillas.275 If the persecutor is a non-governmental person or group, then the
applicant must show that the government is unwilling or unable to protect
her. The INS Guidelines instruct that "[i]t will be important in this regard,
though not conclusive, to determine whether the applicant has actually
sought help from government authorities.,,276 Furthermore, evidence that an
attempt to seek such protection would be futile is also relevant to the Asylum Officers' evaluation. 277
The INS Guidelines assert that although the persecutor may be the government, the question still may arise as to whether the harm inflicted or
threatened is "purely private. ,,278 By implication it appears the INS is contending that if the harm is purely private then it will render the applicant
ineligible for protection. The INS Guidelines cite to Lazo-Majano279 as an
example of a claim in which the persecution was inflicted by a government
agent, but was a "private act." As discussed previously, Ms. Lazo-Majano
was "singled out to be bullied, beaten, injured, raped, and enslaved" by a
sergeant in the Salvadoran Armed Forces who subjected her to his will by
constantly threatening that he would reveal her to be a subversive. 28O Eventually the sergeant carried out his threat, telling a friend of his in the police
that she was a subversive. 281 According to the INS Guidelines, "[blased on
evidence of severe treatment of subversives by Salvadoran authorities, the
court determined that the applicant was a refugee on account of the political
271. Id. (citing Matter of VillaIta, Int. Dec. No. 3126 (BIA 1990».
272. Id. at 16.
273. See, e.g., Matter of A- and Z-, A72-190-893, A72-793-219 (U Arlington, Va.
Dec. 20, 1994), reported in /J Grants Asylum to Woman Based on Spousal Abuse, INS
Guidelines Imminent, supra note 25, at 521 (recognizing spousal abuse as persecution for
asylum purposes); Matter ofM- K-, A72-374-558 (U Arlington, Va. Aug. 9, 1995), reported in /J Grants Asylum on the Basis of Persecution Relating to Female Genital Mutilation, supra note 3, at 1188 (recognizing female genital mutilation and spousal abuse as
grounds for asylum eligibility).
274. See, e.g., Constable, supra note 5, at Dl (discussing gender-based asylum case in
which female relatives kidnapped applicant and held her down while her clitoris was cut
off during female genital mutilation ritual). See also More on /J Decision Granting Asylum Based on Genital Mutilation, supra note 5, at 1265 (discussing the same case).
275. See, e.g., Gomez, 947 F.2d 660; Campos-Guardado, 809 F.2d 285.
276. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 17.
277. Id. at 17.
278. Id. at 16.
279. 813 F.2d 1432.
280. Id. at 1434.
281. Id. at 1433.

300

HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 8:2

opinion that could be imputed to her because of the public accusation, even
without evidence that she actually held subversive views.,,282
The INS Guidelines conclude that although the act might have been interpreted as "purely private" which is not covered by the INA, the persecution was held to be on account of a protected characteristic because of the
persecutor's conduct. 283 This conclusion implies that the sergeant's public
declaration of her alleged subversion transformed her claim from a private to
a public claim. However, Ms. Lazo-Majano was granted asylum because
she met all the requirements of the refugee defmition: she had suffered severe abuse which constituted persecution; her persecution was inflicted by
an agent of the government; and the persecution was on account of the political opinion imputed to her by the sergeant. This is the crux of the claim,
that the persecution was on account of a protected ground. By implying that
Ms. Lazo-Majano's asylum claim was not viable until the sergeant's public
statement, the INS misinterprets the liberal holding of the case.
The INS Guidelines appropriately compare Lazo-Majano to Matter of
Pierre284 to clarify the distinction between public and private acts. In Matter of Pierre, the applicant was abused by her husband and could not receive
protection from the government because her husband was a government officia1. 285 The applicant's claim was denied because she did not have a claim
of persecution on account of one of the five enumerated grounds. 286 The fact
that her husband was a legislator did not by itself establish a claim of persecution on account of political opinion even though the Haitian government
would not restrain him. 287 Similarly in Klawitter v. INS,288 the applicant's
failure to predicate a claim on one of the five enumerated grounds resulted in
a denial of asylum. Again, harm (sexual harassment) inflicted by a government official does not by itself constitute persecution on account of political
opinion. The INS Guidelines do note that sexual harassment could be serious enough to rise to the requisite level of persecution and an asylum claim
could be based on sexual abuse by a government official if the harm is inflicted on account of a protected ground. 289 These cases starkly illuminate
the difficulty women refugees face in presenting gender-based asylum
claims. Not all persecution that women suffer falls into one of the protected
categories, resulting in a denial of gender-based claims because of the rigid282. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 16.
283. Id.
284. 15 I. & N. Dec. 461 (BIA 1975).
285. Id. at 462.
286. Id. at 462-63. Ms. Pierre sought withholding of deportation under INA § 243(h)
which provides that the Attorney General shall not deport or return an alien whose life or
freedom would be threatened on account of one of the five enumerated grounds. Proposed
Guidelines, supra note 51, at 814 n.8.
287. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 17.
288. 970 F.2d 149 (6th Cir. 1992).
289. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 17 n.15.
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ity of the extant structure which favors male applicants over female.
The INS Guidelines further instruct the Asylum Officers that although
acts of persecution may appear to be private, they "must determine whether
a reasonable basis exists for regarding the act as a 'public' one that can be
attributed to the government or an agent the government is unable or unwilling to control. ,,290 The adjudicators must also ascertain whether the asserted
persecution is on account of a protected ground. However, as noted above,
although the persecution may be private, if it is on account of a protected
characteristic and is inflicted by the government or someone the government
is unwilling or unable to control, then the applicant has met her burden of
demonstrating eligibility for asylum under the INA's refugee defmition. The
adjudicator should also thoroughly explore the motive of the persecutor, the
level of the harm inflicted or threatened, the identity of the persecutor, and
the role of the government in offering protection. 291
The INS Guidelines state that international protection is appropriately
provided when an asylum seeker can show that national protection is not
available. 292 Thus, after demonstrating that the persecutor is the government
or someone the State is unwilling or unable to control, an applicant must
further establish that the persecution exists nationwide. 293 If the applicant
fails to demonstrate the existence of both of these factors, her asylum claim
will most likely be denied. Two potential remedies, relocation in the applicant's country of origin and government protection in other parts of the
country, may preclude her from proving the nationwide persecution requirement. 294 The INS Guidelines assert that if there is evidence that either of
these two remedies is available, then the applicant will not qualify for asylum. 295
If the asylum seeker can avoid further or feared persecution by relocating to another part of the country, then she will not be eligible for asylum. 296
Furthermore, the Guidelines instruct that if a government "would offer protection from otherwise private acts of harm elsewhere in the country than the
locality where those acts take place, then normally the applicant will not
290. Id. at 17.
291. Id. at 17 n.l5.
292. Id. at 18.
293. Id. (citing Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (BIA 1985), overruled in part by
Matter ofMogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (BIA 1987); Matter of Fuentes , 19 I. & N. Dec.
658 (BIA 1988); Matter ofR-, Int. Dec. 3195 at 7-9 (BIA 1992); Quintanilla-Ticas v. INS,
783 F.2d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 1986).
294. The INS Guidelines imply that this second requirement must be established only in
claims which are based on "private" persecution, in contrast to persecution by the government which would inherently exist nationwide. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 18.
295. Id.
296. In Lazo-Majano, the court took notice of the small size of EI Salvador and the applicant's testimony that her persecutor threatened to look for her all over EI Salvador if she
ever left him, to conclude that the applicant would be "in serious jeopardy if forced to return to her native land." 813 F.2d at 1435.
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qualify for asylum.,,297 According to the INS Guidelines, these two potential
remedies become crucial in the Asylum Officer's evaluation especially when
the asylum claim is based on "private actions" such as domestic violence
from which the state does not offer protection?98
Adjudicators are instructed to consider numerous factors in these
evaluations. 299 They must explore the extent to which the government provides redress for or protection against persecution and the degree to which
the risk of harm exists nationwide. 3°O The INS Guidelines cite to the
UNHCR Handbook for guidance regarding the reasonableness of requiring
relocation. 301 The UNHCR Handbook states "a person will not be excluded
from refugee status merely because [she] could have sought refuge in another part of the same country, if under all the circumstances it would not
have been reasonable to expect [her] to do SO.,,302 When evaluating whether
it is "reasonable under all the circumstances" to expect a victim of domestic
violence or other "private" acts to relocate, adjudicators must look to the
facts of the particular case. 303 Asylum Officers should carefully explore the
availability of government protection in other parts of the country, as well as
the circumstances which provoked the persecution or the fear of persecution. 304 In addition to determining whether protection was obtainable as a
factual matter, the adjudicator must also consider whether the law of the
applicant's country afforded protection. With these considerations in
mind,305 the Asylum Officer can make a determination as to whether under
all the circumstances, "it would be reasonable to expect a woman to seek
residency elsewhere in her country .,,306
297. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 18 (citing Beltran-Zavala v. INS, 912 F.2d 1027
(9th Cir. 1990)).
298. Id. at 18.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id. (citing UNHCR HANDBOOK 21-22, i 91). The Proposed Guidelines assert that
"an asylum applicant does not have to establish that the persecution she fears exists nationwide if, under all the circumstances, it would have been unreasonable for her to seek
refuge in another part of the country." Proposed Guidelines, supra note 51, at 817 (citing
UNHCR HANDBOOK 21-22, i 91 and Matter ofR-, Int. Dec. No. 3195, slip op. at 8 (BIA
1992».
303. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 18.
304. Id. The Proposed Guidelines instruct the adjudicator to consider "the ability of the
persecutor to act nationwide, whether the woman could genuinely access protection in another part of her country, and whether the protection would have been meaningful." See
Proposed Guidelines, supra note 51, at 817 & nn.29, 30.
305. "Relevant factors to consider are financial, logistical and other barriers that may
prevent the woman from reaching internal safety and whether the quality of internal protection meets basic norms of civil, political and socio-economic human rights." Proposed
Guidelines, supra note 51, at 817 (citing JAMES HATHAWAY, THE LAw OF REFUGEE STATUS
134 (1991 ).
306. INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 18. The INS Guidelines conclude by emphasizing
that a determination such as the reasonableness of relocation "underscores the general
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VI. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING GENDER-BASED
ASYLUM JURISPRUDENCE
Subsequent to the issuance of the INS Guidelines, significant decisions
in gender-based asylum cases have altered the face of gender-based asylum
jurisprudence. Whether the INS Guidelines themselves produced these recent developments is not clear. However, apart from one aberrational decision in the Ninth Circuit, permissive decisions recently issued by the BIA
and some Immigration Judges indicate that the INS Guidelines have made a
positive impact on their intended recipients. The BIA, Us and federal courts
have fmally started to create a uniform body of gender-based asylum case
307
law which women refugees can utilize in presenting their asylum claims.

A. THE EN BANe DECISION IN FISHER V. INS 308
The en bane panel's decision in Fisher represents the one regressive development in gender-based asylum jurisprudence following the issuance of
the INS Guidelines. Fisher v. INS was first appealed to the Ninth Circuit by
309
Ms. Fisher in 1993.
The Ninth Circuit's fIrst decision in the case was issued by a three-judge panel. That panel granted Ms. Fisher's petition for
review of the BIA's decision, vacated that decision, and remanded for further consideration. The three-judge panel's decision is the Fisher decision
discussed in the INS Guidelines. On October 2, 1995, almost a year after
the three-judge panel's decision was issued, the INS' request for a rehearing
en bane was granted. A majority of the en bane panel reversed the threejudge panel, withdrew the Ninth Circuit's earlier decision to remand to the
need to develop the record fully with respect to both the applicant's particular circumstances and the conditions prevailing in the country of origin." Id. Acknowledging that
adjudicators "must be able to rely on objective and current information on the legal and
cultural situation of women in their countries of origin, on the incidence of violence, including both sexual and domestic, and on the adequacy of state protection afforded to
them," the INS Guidelines state that the INS Resource Information Center (RIC) will
"attempt to assure that information concerning violations of the rights of women are distributed regularly and systematically to all Asylum Offices." See id. at 8.
307. In contrast to the progressive decisions of adjudicators at all levels, Congress has
taken a much more regressive approach to immigration. In 1996, Congress enacted the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and the megal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA). Both pieces of legislation revised the
asylum application process, making it much more difficult to receive an award of asylum.
A complete discussion of the statutory changes effected by AEDPA and IIRAIRA is beyond
the scope of this comment. For a discussion of the impact of these two laws on the asylum
procedure, see generally FRAGOMEN, JR., ET AL., supra note 9, at 5-1-5-20.
308. 79 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 1996).
309. The case was argued and submitted on April 13, 1996. See Fisher v. INS, 61 F.3d
1366, 1366 (9th Cir. 1994). Ms. Fisher is an Iranian woman who sought asylum based on
her opposition to the Iranian dress and moral conduct code. In her asylum application and
appeals, Ms. Fisher claimed she had a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of
her religious and political beliefs-opposition to the Iranian theocratic government and its
fundamentalist Moslem doctrines. For a more detailed discussion of the facts of the case,
see 79 F.3d at 958-60; 61 F.3d at 1368-70.
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BIA, and denied Ms. Fisher's asylum claim.
The majority found that Ms. Fisher had not suffered persecution and did
not have a well-founded fear of future persecution. 310 Rather, the majority
stated that the applicant "merely has established that she faces a possibility
of prosecution for an act deemed criminal in Iranian society, which is made
applicable to all women in that country,,,311 and prosecution for general
crimes does not amount to persecution unless the punishment is disproportionately severe or the prosecution is pretextual. 312 According to the majority, Ms. Fisher failed to establish that either of these two exceptions were
applicable. 313 In addition to failing to demonstrate that she had suffered persecution or faced future persecution, the majority further held that Ms.
Fisher did not satisfy the nexus requirement. 314 The majority concluded that
Ms. Fisher's claim should be denied because she received only routine punishment for violating generally applicable laws, and she failed to show that
she had suffered persecution or had a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of her political or religious beliefs. 315
Despite the fact that a majority of the panel overruled the earlier decision, the number of judges on the panel who expressed dissatisfaction with
the majority's decision indicates that the precedential value of the en bane
decision may be questionable. Judge Canby, joined by Judge Thompson,
filed a concurring opinion "to emphasize a crucial aspect of this case.,,316
Judge Canby clarified that Ms. Fisher's asylum claim was not premised on
gender-based persecution. Rather, she sought asylum from persecution on
account of her religious and political beliefs. Thus, as Judge Canby stated:
There is no issue of gender discrimination before our en bane court.
The majority opinion should not be read as establishing that enforcement of criminal laws against women, or the infliction of suffering upon women, because they are women cannot constitute persecution under the Act. All that properly can be said is that the
enforcement of criminal laws against Fisher because she is a woman
does not, on this record, constitute persecution on grounds of religion or political belief-the only two grounds urged by Fisher. 317
Judge Canby further explained that he did not join the majority opinion
because it might be misinterpreted too easily as deciding an issue that was
310. 79 F.3d at 960-62.
311. [d. at 962 (citations omitted).
312. [d. at 961-62.
313. [d. at 962.
314. [d. at 963 ("Because Fisher has demonstrated only discrimination on account of her
sex, not persecution on account of her religious or political beliefs, she has failed to carry
her burden .... ").
315. [d. at 964.
316. [d. at 965 (Canby, J., concurring).
317. [d. at 965-66 (Canby, J., concurring).
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not raised by Ms. Fisher-whether persecution of women because they are
women represents a ground for asylum under the INA. 3I8 Judge Canby
pointed to statements in the majority opinion which may be construed as
"foreclosing the possibility that persecution of women on account of their
gender presents a ground of asylum under the ACt.,,3I9 He concluded that
although the majority's "gratuitous statements" only constitute dicta, he felt
the court should not express a view on the subject until it has been briefed
and argued in a case that turns on the point. 320
In addition to the reservations expressed by the concurring judges, Judge
Noonan, joined by Judge Fletcher, filed a scathing dissent. 321 He stated that
the principal division on the en bane panel was caused by the issue of
whether the panel should remand requiring reconsideration or whether a motion to reopen by Ms. Fisher should be left to the discretion of the INS and
the BIA.322 The dissent would have affrrmed the three-judge panel's decision, agreeing that the case should be remanded to the BIA for further consideration. 323 Judge Noonan stated that his decision was based on "the seachange in governmental policy" regarding gender-based asylum claims, specifically, the issuance of the INS Guidelines. 324
He noted that the INS Guidelines provide particular guidance on the issues presented in the case before the en bane panel: "The guidelines are
an invitation to develop asylum law with special attention to the problems
of women oppressed on account of their nonconformity with the moral
codes of a rigorous regime.,,325 In fact, the INS Guidelines cite the threejudge panel's opinion "[w]ithout the slightest criticism of the analysis and
conclusions reached by the panel.,,326 Ultimately, Judge Noonan emphasized that the majority's dicta regarding gender persecution reflect only the
opinions of those judges making up the majority: "Its dicta do not constitute Ninth Circuit law.,,327
Some commentators have similarly noted that the majority opinion in
Fisher is not likely to be followed. The authors of one article noted that the
internal inconsistencies in the majority opinion led the dissenters to suggest

318. Id. at 966 (Canby, J., concurring).
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. At one point in his dissenting opinion, Judge Noonan stated: "We are not very far
from The Handmaid's tale when seven judges of this court are capable of expressing such a
view." Fisher, 79 F.3d at 969 (Noonan, J., dissenting).
322. Id. at 967 (Noonan, J., dissenting).
323. Id. The majority left open the possibility that Ms. Fisher could move to reopen the
proceedings before the BIA pursuant to 8 c.P.R. §§ 3.2, 208.19. Id.; seealsoPisher, 79 P.3d
at 963.
324. Fisher, 79 F.2d at 967 (Noonan, J., dissenting).
325. Id. at 968 (Noonan, J., dissenting).
326. Id.
327. Id. at 969 (Noonan, J., dissenting).
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future judicial nullification. 328 Another author criticized the Fisher majority
for reviewing the case "without regard to the then-recently promulgated INS
gender guidelines and without so much as a mention of a the important developments in the law regarding gender-based asylum claims.,,329 Ultimately, the majority opinion in Fisher must be viewed in context. It was
decided without any consideration given to the INS Guidelines and before
subsequent gender-based asylum decisions issued by the BIA. Furthermore,
the Fisher opinion reaffrrmed the principle that federal courts must afford
deference to BIA determinations. 33o Thus, because Fisher is inconsistent
with subsequent BIA decisions, its authoritative weight is likely to be minimal. 331
B. IN RE KASINGA332
In re Kasinga represents one of the most highly publicized asylum
claims granted by the BIA.333 It is also the second gender-based asylum
precedent issued by the BIA and the fIrst BIA decision granting asylum to a
woman fleeing female genital mutilation (FGM). After being forced into a
polygamous marriage and facing the imminent threat of being forced to undergo FGM, Ms. Kasinga fled Togo, her native country, with the assistance
of her mother and sister. 334 She took the fIrst flight out of the country ending
up in Germany where she spent the next two months. 335 In December 1994,
Ms. Kasinga arrived in the U.S. and immediately applied for asylum when
she entered the country. She spent the next 16 months in INS detention until
she was released in April 1996. 336 An Immigration Judge (D) in Philadelphia denied Ms. Kasinga's request for asylum, fmding that she was not
credible and that she would not qualify for asylum even if she was credible. 337 Ms. Kasinga subsequently appealed the D's decision to the BIA and
retained new counsel. 338 The main issues addressed on appeal were credibility and substantive eligibility for asylum. 339

328. Anker et al., supra note 24, at 1179.
329. Goldberg, supra note 185, at 894.
330. Anker et al., supra note 24, at 1179.
331. Id. ("Fisher is therefore arguably not a relevant opinion"); but see Sharif v. INS, 87
F.3d 932, 936 n.3 (9th Cir. 1996) (''The Ninth Circuit has concluded that persecution on
account of gender is not included as a category allowing relief ....").
332. In re Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278, 1996 BIA LEXIS 15 (BIA June 13, 1996). For an
extensive discussion and analysis of the case by the attorney who represented Ms. Kasinga
on her appeal before the BIA, see Musalo, supra note 84, at 853.
333. See Goldberg, supra note 185, at 895.
334. Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278, 1996 BIA LEXIS 15, at *4-5; see also Musalo, supra note
84, at 854.
335. Id.
336. Id.

337. Musalo, supra note 84, at 855.
338. Id.
339. Id.
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The BIA reversed the U's decision and granted Ms. Kasinga's asylum
application. In contrast to the U, the BIA found the applicant to be credible
on the basis of her testimony in support of her application and the substantial background information she provided. 34O The Board specifically rejected
the U's credibility determination, rmding the applicant reasonably and adequately explained the issues raised by the U. 341 The BIA also held that Ms.
Kasinga faced persecution on account of membership in a particular social
group. Her particular social group was comprised of "young women of the
Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe who have not had FGM, as practiced by that
tribe, and who oppose the practice. ,,342
To support their social group formulation, the Board cited to Matter of
Acosta/43 Matter of H_,344 and the Third Circuit's decision in Fatin v.
INS. 345 The BIA stated that a particular social group is "dermed by common
characteristics that members of the group either cannot change or should not
be required to change because such characteristics are fundamental to their
individual identities.,,346 The Board continued: "The characteristics of being
a 'young woman' and a 'member of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe' cannot
be changed. The characteristic of having intact genitalia is one that is so
fundamental to the individual identity of a young woman that she should not
be required to change it.,,347
Although Kasinga represents an important step forward in the development of "membership in a particular social group" asylum law, the Board
opted to take a more conservative approach by formulating a very specific
and circumspect social group of which Ms. Kasinga was a member. Their
formulation reflects the BIA's and the federal courts' reluctance to construct
broad social groups which could accommodate "too many" asylum applicants. Although creating narrowly drawn social groups to prevent the
hordes of women refugees fleeing gender-based persecution may allay the
fears of anti-immigration proponents, the reality is that whether the social
group is dermed narrowly or broadly, that flood of women is not likely to
inundate America's ports of entry.348 Thus, by formulating such a specifi340. Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278, 1996 BIA LEXIS 15, at *17-19.
341. [d.
342. [d.

343. 19 I. & N. Dec. 211,233 (BIA 1985), overruled in part by Matter oJMogharrabi, 19
I. & N. Dec. 438 (BIA 1987).
344. Int. Dec. 3276 (BIA 1996).
345. Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1241 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating that Iranian women who
refuse to conform to the Iranian Government's gender-specific laws and social norms may
well satisfy the Acosta definition). This parenthetical was provided by the BIA. See Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278, 1996 BIA LEXIS 15, at *21.
346. Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278, 1996 BIA LEXIS 15, at *21-22.
347. [d. at *22.
348. "It is often expensive, difficult, and traumatic to uproot oneself and flee the country
of one's birth. Women more than men are unlikely to have the resources, freedom, and the
means to make such a journey." Goldberg, supra note 185, at 896. Ms. Goldberg also
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cally defmed social group in Kasinga, the Board limited to some extent the
favorable impact of its decision on the progression of gender-based asylum
jurisprudence.349
The issue of persecution constituted the most contentious issue before
the BIA. The INS proposed a new framework for analyzing the persecution
standard which would severely restrict the asylum eligibility of women who
had suffered FGM in the past. The INS argued that for haqn or suffering to
rise to the level of persecution required by the INA, it must be inflicted with
malignant or punitive intent. 350 In FGM cases, the INS noted that this standard would rarely be met because presumably practitioners of FGM "believe
that they are simply performing an important cultural rite that bonds the individual to society.,,351
To remedy this outcome, the INS suggested that the malignant or punitive intent requirement be waived when the type of harm "is so extreme as to
shock the conscience of the society from which asylum is sought.,,352 To
satisfy the INS' "shock the conscience test," an applicant must demonstrate
that the harm is extreme, the harm is inflicted on an unconsenting or resisting individual, and the individual must be seized and subjected to the extreme harm, not merely suffer the consequences of refusal. 353 To add insult
to injury, the INS further explained that "FGM victims who were mutilated
as children are presumed to have consented to it," and thus have not experienced persecution which could constitute the basis for a claim of past persecution. 354
Clearly, the INS' new framework was a poorly veiled attempt to limit
the eligibility for asylum of women who had suffered FGM in the past.
Ironically, the INS' approach directly contradicts the policies, spirit, and.directives found in the INS Guidelines. 355 Rather than seeking to harmonize
existing case law, the INS attempted to create an exclusionary framework
provides enlightening statistics from Canada which promulgated gender-based guidelines
two years before the INS. During the two years after the issuance of the Canadian Guidelines, 40,000 refugee claims were filed in Canada; only 1,130 of those claims were genderrelated. Out of the 1,130 gender-related claims filed, 483 were granted, 273 denied, 284
were still pending, and 126 had been withdrawn, terminated or abandoned. Id. at 896-97.
349. But see Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278, 1996 BIA LEXIS 15, at *43-49 (Rosenberg, concurring) (criticizing majority's narrow social group formulation and discussing significance
of broader social group formulations).
350. Musalo, supra note 84, at 856.
351. Id. (quoting INS brief, at 16-17).
352 Id.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. See, e.g., INS Guidelines, supra note 7, at 4 ("For example, rape ... , sexual abuse
and domestic violence, infanticide and genital mutilation are forms of mistreatment primarily directed at girls and women and they may serve as evidence of past persecution on account of one or more of the five grounds.") (emphasis added). See also Kasinga, Int. Dec.
3278, 1996 BIA LEXIS 15, at *50 (Rosenberg, concurring) (noting INS' failure to make
reference to its own gender-based guidelines).
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which would be much more restrictive in practice than the legal approaches
it promulgated in its own guidelines. Despite the INS' efforts to create a
restrictive gender-based asylum precedent, the BIA rejected the INS' proposed framework, fmding that PGM constitutes persecution within the
meaning of the INA. 356 Although the INS seems to be attempting to impede
the progressive development of gender-based asylum case law, fortunately,
adjudicators have not been hindered by these obstructions.

C.

OTHER DEVELOPMENTS

In addition to the important precedent set by Kasinga, there are a
growing number of decisions by Immigration Judges which have further
developed gender-based asylum jurisprudence. In Matter of A- and Z-,357
a Jordanian woman was granted asylum based on the severe, sustained
domestic abuse she suffered at the hands of her husband for many years. 358
Despite the INS' argument that the harm she faced was the product of a
personal marital dispute, the IT held that she was eligible for asylum on account of her membership in a particular social group and her political
opinion. 359 The IT found that she was a member of a particular group of
women who challenge the traditions of Jordanian society and government
and that this opposition also constitutes her political opinion. 360
In Matter of M-K-, 36 I a woman from Sierra Leone was granted asylum on account of past persecution and a well-founded fear of future persecution. The applicant had been forcibly subjected to PGM and severe domestic abuse which comprised her past persecution claims, and she feared
future persecution on account of her political party activism. 362 Significantly, the IT held that domestic violence constituted persecution under the
INA. 363 Moreover, the IT found that "based on the domestic abuse, the applicant could be granted asylum based on political opinion 'for her resistance to mandated female subservience and complaints about physical
spousal abuse, or membership in a particular social group that consists of
women who have been punished with physical spousal abuse for attempting
to assert their individual autonomy.,,,364 The IT also concluded that the applicant had a well-founded fear of future persecution based on past political
356. Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278, 1996 BIA LEXIS 15, at *19-20.
357. Matter of A- and Z-, A72 190 893, A72 793 219 (U Arlington, Va. Dec. 20,
1994). reported in Anker et al.. supra note 24. at 1180.
358. Anker et al., supra note 24, at 1180.
359. [d.
360. [d.

361. MatterofM-K-, A72 374 558 (ll Arlington, Va. Aug. 9,1995), reported in Anker
et al., supra note 24, at 1180.
362. Anker et al., supra note 24, at 1180.
363. [d.
364. [d. (quoting Matter ofM- K-, A72 374 558 (ll Arlington, Va. Aug. 9, 1995) at
13).
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activism, and that when measuring the past infliction of FGM in light of
human rights nonns, it rises to the level of persecution. 365
In Matter of D-M-, 366 an U granted asylum to a woman from Liberia
who had suffered at the hands of guerrilla forces. The applicant was taken
captive by Liberian guerrilla forces and was held for more than six
months. 367 During her captivity, she was repeatedly raped by a number of
soldiers and by a high-ranking officer who designated her as his "wife. ,,368
Based on the Second Circuit's decision in Gomez v. INS,369 the U found that
the applicant was "persecuted not merely because of her gender, but because
of the personal and inviolate component of her gender, which was her sexual
identity.,,37o The Immigration Judge determined that she was eligible for
asylum based upon her membership in a particular social group of women
who share the immutable characteristic of having had their sexual identity
attacked and violated and who share a common interest in keeping their sexual identity inviolate and free from wanton terror. 371
The cases discussed above represent just three among a wide variety of
cases heard by Immigration Judges who have reached varying conclusions.
There are currently a number of gender-based asylum claims pending before
Immigration Judges throughout the country.372 Inevitably, for every grant of
a gender-related asylum claim, there is likely to be a denial. However, these
recent trend-setting decisions represent a grass-roots movement of sorts; a
movement which is inclined to interpret asylum law in a much more permissive manner, a manner which creates more grants than denials of asylum.
As the number of these decisions increase, the body of gender-based asylum
jurisprudence likewise expands. If domestic violence becomes a more common basis for asylum and social group fonnulations become less circumspect and more inclusive, this growth can only bode well for women refugees
seeking asylum in the future.

CONCLUSION
When the INS Guidelines were issued in May 1995, asylum advocates
anticipated a subsequent evolution of the law of gender-based asylum. Unfortunately, that metamorphosis has yet to materialize. The INS Guidelines

365. Anker et aI., supra note 24, at 1180.
366. A40 379 801 (ll New York, N.Y. Nov. 22, 1993) reported in Anker et aI., supra
note 24, at 1181.
367. Anker et aI., supra note 24, at 1181.
368. Id.
369. 947 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1991).
370. Anker et al., supra note 24, at 1181 (quoting Matter of D-M-, A40 379 801 (ll
New York, N.Y. Nov. 22,1993).
371. Id.
372. For a brief description of a sampling of these cases, see Anker et aI., supra note 24,
at 1181-82.

Fall 1997]

GENDER-BASED ASYLUM

311

undoubtedly represent a very positive development in the area of asylum
based on gender persecution. However, by emphasizing the current limitations in the case law, the Guidelines adopted a circumspect rather than an
expansive approach to gender-based asylum claims. The inherent deficiencies which pervade the INS Guidelines and their mere advisory nature serve
to significantly limit their impact on gender-based asylum adjudications.
The combination of these factors compels this author to conclude that the
case law, which constitutes the legal basis of the INS Guidelines, must develop to create a legal environment which facilitates uniform adjudications
of gender-based asylum claims.
Under a body of law that is relatively uniform, the divergent holdings in
the stories of the women mentioned at the beginning of this Comment can
become more consistent. That body of gender-based asylum law is currently
in its developmental stage, but it is steadily progressing. Recent decisions
issued by Immigration Judges, the BIA, and federal courts have recognized
the unique forms of abuse that women suffer and have found them to be persecution for asylum purposes. They exemplify a recent trend in immigration
law in which the INS, administrative tribunals, and federal courts have become more willing to grant asylum claims predicated on gender-based persecution. If this trend continues, the submission of gender-based asylum
claims will be far less precarious in the future. Until then, women refugees
will continue to live in fear of being returned to a life of persecution.

